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JPRS Report

Arms Control

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INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Pact Defense Ministers To Meet in November

LD0709213589 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 7 Sep 89

[Text] A conference of defense ministers of Warsaw Pact member states will be held at the beginning of November in Budapest.

ALBANIA

Bush, Shevardnadze Cited on Chemical Weapons

AU2709201689 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 27 Sep 89

[Text] In a speech delivered the other day at the UN General Assembly, U.S. President Bush proposed to the Soviet Union a bilateral agreement to destroy 80 percent of their stocks of chemical weapons. He considered this to be a first step in the direction of an international ban of chemical weapons. Stressing that the world had been for a long time under the threat of chemical warfare, he called for Washington and Moscow to begin to cooperate immediately in order to, as he stated, free the world from such weapons.

Meanwhile, in order not to lag behind the U.S. President's proposal, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, went even further in the speech that he delivered yesterday at the UN General Assembly. Even if an agreement is reached between the two imperialist superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, on these mass extermination weapons, although this may be advertized publicly as a move to secure peace and avoid war, in the final analysis this will be but another step in a bargain reached by the two superpowers to secure their world hegemony.

Baker-Shevardnadze Wyoming Meeting Discussed

AU2709163489 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 24 Sep 89 p 4

[Lulzim Cota article: "Ritual Baker-Shevardnadze Meetings"]

[Text] The Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze has made an official visit to Washington, where he met President Bush, to whom he handed a message from Gorbachev. Later, on Friday and Saturday, Shevardnadze had talks with his colleague Baker in Wyoming. The agenda of the talks included many problems ranging from disarmament, regional conflicts, and bilateral and East-West relations, to deciding on a Bush-Gorbachev summit meeting.

Among the many topics discussed and the interviews that were given, Shevardnadze's remarks about the time at which these talks took place are particularly striking. On his arrival, he underlined that "We have come to Washington at an important period in United States-Soviet relations. It is a time when Soviet society is being transformed and when many aspects of East-West relations are changing." Put more simply, the mutual support and concessions in certain issues were a leitmotiv of the talks. The Soviet Union, at this moment of internal crisis, requires a "success" abroad, and particularly expects it to come from their American partners. On the eve of the talks, the United States secretary of state, Baker, reported that "The United States will surrender its demand for the elimination of Soviet mobile intercontinental missiles at the START talks." Moscow called this a "very welcome change," while at the same time the United States' concession was made "on the condition that Congress approves the financing of MX and Midgetman missile systems." It is paradoxical that these reciprocal concessions, which intensify the arms race in the field of intercontinental missiles, can be made at a time when the reduction of these very kinds of missile are at the center of the Baker-Shevardnadze talks.

Another problem discussed at the official Baker-Shevardnadze talks was the preparation of conditions for a Bush-Gorbachev summit meeting. The two sides were united regarding the necessity of such a meeting. "A summit meeting is necessary; there is no doubt about that," stressed Shevardnadze after his meeting with Bush. However, he added, "This summit must be prepared as well as possible."

Apart from this euphoric tone, even if an agreement is reached, no illusions can be entertained that Soviet-American treaties help to strengthen international security.

BULGARIA

Baker-Shevardnadze Meeting To Give 'Impetus'

AU0709121389 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 6 Sep 89 p 5

[Ivanka Khlebarova article: "Anticipated Impetus"]

[Text] The meeting between USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker will take place at the very beginning of the forthcoming political autumn. Undoubtedly, the meeting, which will take place on 22 and 23 September at Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming, will give a new impetus to resolving many important issues of USSR-U.S. bilateral relations, as well as many world issues.

The agenda encompasses issues that traditionally are being reviewed at the two countries' summit meetings: disarmament and talks related to various kinds of weapons, and many important regional issues related to Afghanistan, Cambodia, Southern Africa, and Central America. Topical world problems such as combating the drug traffic, combating terrorism, and ecological issues will also be reviewed.

According to well-informed sources, the two foreign ministers will also discuss the preparations for the forthcoming Mikhail Gorbachev-George Bush summit.

All this shows that the forthcoming dialogue will encompass a broad range of issues and will give a new impetus to resolving many important problems of our time.

Undoubtedly, the 50 percent reduction of the USSR and U.S. strategic offensive weapons will occupy a leading place among the disarmament issues. As is known, a good opportunity to achieve real progress emerged at the USSR-U.S. Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons.

The Shevardnadze-Baker meeting, which will take place only 5 days before the resumption of the Geneva talks, is expected to give a new impetus to those talks.

In recent years USSR-U.S. relations have been developing in a dynamic fashion. Many seeds, planted months ago, have already sprouted. The meetings between the two countries' foreign ministers are no longer merely routine affairs, but give an impetus to resolving many bilateral and international problems. Their contribution in this respect is beyond any doubt.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Bush's UN Speech Offers 'Imaginary Vision'

LD0110140189 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0830 GMT 1 Oct 89

["Review of Events in the World This Week by Editor Antonin Kostka"—headline]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted reviewing the warming of USSR-U.S. relations in the recent past; passage quoting from the Varna document]

Let us take the speech delivered by President Bush at the UN on 25 September. It must be seen that with the exception of several hints it lacked the traditional confrontational attacks. It must, however, be seen too that it was so different from the speech delivered by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze a day later that it does not justify us to speak about excessive agreement of views and stances. Shevardnadze explained the USSR views on all issues of disarmament, international cooperation, ecology, and resources, and put forward a number of new proposals towards a more thorough harmony of all-human and national interests.

Unfortunately President Bush avoided this and offered instead a rosy but unfortunately a very imaginary vision of the world of free nations and free individuals which is in his view within reach today. In connection with this new world of his he spoke about the need to open all markets and of freedom of trade, the problems of ecology followed and only then he mentioned the need to disarm and followed it up with the appeal of joint fight against drugs. His only disarmament proposal on chemical weapons was consequently devalued by the negative attitude of the Ministry of Defense and of his own Administration and was seen by experts as a virtue of necessity because the Congress had ordered the government a long time ago to eradicate the U.S. obsolete and badly stored chemical ammunition.

If the Western media sound too optimistic in these circumstances, then naturally this is not a sign of poor judgement or unilateral overvaluation of facts. [words indistinct] mainly on the speech of President Bush "Washington now caught up with Moscow in Peace Offensive" show clearly what are their aims. Furthermore it is easy to work out that the best way to demobilize the public and avert its attention from the issue of fight for peace is to convince it that everything is fine that it is not only the East but the West too who cares for disarmament.

Fortunately the United Nations General Assembly session itself showed that it would not be as easy as some strategists of the psychological war imagine. Nobody objects to the "new world of freedom" but the overwhelming majority expresses a conviction that this new world of freedom must be liberated above all from the fear of nuclear or ecological disaster and that this freedom ought to be such that it would not make possible for the strong to live at the expense of the weak, that it would not violate international harmony, the harmony of rights, and interests of all nations. It is not conjucturalist strategy [as heard] but the joint will and desire of the nations that is a reliable base on which a realistic prognosis could be worked out. Only this is a source for justified optimism.

FRG To Inspect Military Situation 30 Sep-2 Oct

LD2909194489 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1600 GMT 29 Sep 89

[Text] The FRG Government has made a request through diplomatic channels for the opportunity to carry out an inspection of military activity on Czechoslovak territory under the Stockholm conference documents on measures to build confidence and security and on disarmament in Europe. This inspection will be carried out beginning tomorrow [30 September] until 2 October this year.

Tank Dismantling Begins in North Moravia

AU2809201289 Prague CTK in English 1715 GMT 28 Sep 89

[Text] Novy Jicin, North Moravia, Sept 28 (CTK)—The dismantling and scrapping of tanks, provided for by a decision of the State Defence Council of January this year, started in a military repair factory here today. The scrapping of a total number of 850 tanks in 1989-90 is part of a Czechoslovak unilateral disarmament initiative, which envisages also the transfer of 20,000 soldiers to construction firms, the dissolution of six military formations, and the scrapping of 165 armoured vehicles and 51 warplanes.

Director of the military repair factory Jiri Kusak told newsmen that a minimum of 100 T-55 tanks will be broken in pieces this year and 250 next year in Novy Jicin. Some parts from the tanks will be used as spare parts in other tank units.

Chief of the tank service of the Federal Defence Ministry Major-General Karel Gabriel said that altogether 116 T-54 and T-55 tanks have so far been broken to pieces or rebuilt to be used as training vehicles.

Jackson Hole Meetings 'Very Productive'

AU2809113889 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 26 Sep 89 p 7

[Josef Nyvlt commentary: "Looking for Starting Points"]

[Text] Very comprehensive and very productive—that is the briefest way of characterizing the 3-day meeting which took place between the Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and American representatives at the end of last week. Its course and results are a further testimony to the change which has come about in mutual relations since November 1985 when M. Gorbachev met for the first time with then American President Reagan. Now an agreement has been reached on setting the dates for another Soviet-American summit meeting—the end of spring or the beginning of summer next year. This is one of the most important agreements for the development of dialogue between both countries which was reached during Shevardnadze's talks.

As is well known, since the agreement on the elimination of medium and shorter range missiles was signed, a palpable stagnation has set in, a stagnation caused, first and foremost, by the changes in the White House and by changes to the composition of the American administration. The strategy, of course, has not changed, but the scale of values and priorities has been and is being reevaluated. Prior to Shevardnadze's visit, the lengthy formulation of the Bush administration's foreign policy ideas had been subject to severe criticism in Congress.

The most significant result of the current Soviet-American talks is the hope that the apparently insoluble differences in the approach to reducing the level of strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent can be overcome. This problem has gradually been pushed to the edge of the Bush administration's interests. The new Soviet initiatives—to make agreement contingent neither on talks on space weapons nor on sea-launched cruise missiles and to agree on limits in these spheres separately (while respecting the 1972 antiballistic missile defense treaty); the skeleton agreement on verification measures; and its readiness to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar—have created scope for finding starting points and for bringing the signing of a final document closer. Despite the attempt by some U.S. political circles not to make any concessions in anything and to strive for unilateral advantages, the American proposal to negotiate on mobile strategic missiles has also contributed to joint interest.

A considerable convergence of views has also come about in attitudes to conventional and chemical weapons and on verifying nuclear tests. Substantial differences remain but it is apparent that they are not insurmountable.

The greatest inertia is manifested in American appraisal of regional conflicts where, in spite of forthcoming Soviet initiatives (for example, in relation to Afghanistan and Nicaragua), unrealistic attempts to assert hegemonistic demands still prevail.

The specific results of the 3-day Soviet-American talks will be evaluated in the ensuing weeks and months. Not only within the framework of the disarmament talks but also in the struggle against terrorism, drugs, and in cooperating on environmental protection.

Before the start of the talks in Jackson Hole, E. Shevardnadze said that it is high time to shift from an exchange of views to joint acts. The comprehensive nature and the productivity of the talks have undoubtedly contributed to this aim.

Prague Editor on 'Positive' Reaction to Bush Speech

LD2609213689 Prague Television Service in Czech 1830 GMT 26 Sep 89

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Editor Oldrich Vejvoda, who has just returned from the United States, will answer our question. [passage on UN General Assembly agenda omitted]

How can yesterday's speech of President Bush be compared to the speech of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in reference to dealing with the current main international issues?

[Vejvoda] The U.S. representative's speech was very different from the speeches delivered at previous UN General Assembly sessions. Today there is an effort to find new constructive approaches and mutual understanding; of utmost importance is the search for a dialogue. Regarding the reaction to Bush's speech in New York, it was equally positive as to the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs.

I think it is important that the preparation for the conclusion of an important treaty on 50-percent reduction of strategic [word indistinct] weapons has advanced. Obstacles have been removed as compromises have been reached; we could say this is a very significant change. [passage omitted]

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

U.S. Policy on Arms Control Analyzed

LD2809162489 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1715 GMT 27 Sep 89

[Gerd Kurze commentary]

[Excerpts] It is a reflection of the qualitatively new chapter in Soviet-U.S. relations, as Eduard Shevardnadze characterized the level of his talks with James Baker in yesterday's interview with IZVESTIYA, that on two consecutive days an American and a Soviet politician come up with disarmament proposals in their addresses to the United Nations that go in the same direction. That inspires hope, hope that in the foreseeable time ahead both sides will reveal what lethal chemicals they have in store, that they will succeed in convincing each other and suspicion in this disarmament sector will vanish as inspections take place on either side, and also that a great deal of their poison gas amassed over the past decades will be eliminated without the precondition of a successful conclusion to the more complicated process of reaching agreement among the large group of countries also boasting chemical weapons. [passage omitted]

In this respect, it appears to me, the Soviet and American ideas of chemical disarmament are identical. There are in fact differences, however. While the United States intends to maintain a fair percentage of its chemical weapons, the Soviet Union wants them down to zero. President Bush failed to even mention the issue of cancelling the production of chemical weapons, unlike Shevardnadze who explicitly called for it. He referred to the so-called binary weapons in particular, the large-scale production of which the United States had begun in 1987. The USSR, official declarations say, has done without them.

The United States and Bush himself too, in fact, during his term as vice president, have made chemical weapons the subject of grand declarations, invariably with the reservation, however, that by American interpretation whatever chemical disarmament agreed upon would not affect the binary weapons that the United States had for years been holding ready for production. At the Geneva disarmament conference, where more than 15 years have been spent on producing an international convention banning chemical weapons, it was indicated last year already that an agreement was very close, albeit excluding the new chemical weapons.

What is becoming apparent here is a line of U.S. arms control policy that has also come to the fore in both the Geneva negotiations on nuclear weapons and the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. With regard to the latter, that approach was explicitly recommended yesterday by the American NATO commander in chief in Europe, John Galvin. He advised NATO governments at the negotiating table in Vienna to merely approve of the removal of the oldest of weapons there are.

That would certainly mean at least some disarmament, and regarding the chemical weapons it would even result in an 80 percent removal as proposed by President Bush. At the same time, however, we must not ignore the danger of large stocks of old weapons simply being replaced by smaller amounts of new ones. Armament would thus continue, and the aim of all-out and comprehensive disarmament could well be postponed indefinitely.

Officials Respond Favorably to U.S.-USSR Arms Agreement

Stoph Welcomes Agreement

LD2709132989 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1841 GMT 26 Sep 89

[Text] In Berlin today GDR Prime Minister Willi Stoph welcomed the latest arms control agreements between the USSR and the United States.

It is now a matter of achieving global steps in the disarmament process through joint efforts by all forces of reason and realism. Among these steps are a reduction in strategic offensive weapons, the elimination of chemical weapons, and a reduction in conventional weapons.

In a discussion with Denmark's Environment Minister Lone Dybkjaer, Stoph explained that the GDR regards environment policy as a firm component of its policy of peace, which aims at averting the dangers of a nuclear inferno, at creating a system of international security, and worldwide detente.

Minister Dybkjaer agreed that only in peace are there conditions for carrying out the rational use and protection of natural resources within national and international frameworks.

Both sides pointed to good bilateral cooperation in the environment. This had a positive influence on the progress of the CSCE process. Particularly important are contacts between the two countries' experts regarding the exchange of scientific and technical information and experience, in particular on aspects of maintaining the purity of the air and protecting forests and waters.

Minister Dybkjaer arrived in the GDR yesteday and had talks with her counterpart, Dr Hans Reichelt. Today in the Cottbus Area, a center of the GDR's coal and energy sector, she familiarized herself with environmental protection in this region.

'Positive Effects' Seen

LD2809090389 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0224 GMT 28 Sep 89

[Text] "After the speech by U.S. President Bush before the full UN Assembly one should be able to proceed from the fact that Washington is ready to accept a global ban on all chemical weapons, the destruction of stocks within 10 years and effective controls on this," the GDR newspaper NEUES DEUTSCHLAND emphasizes in a commentary on Thursday. The Soviet Union proposed, even before the convening of the convention on the worldwide ban, a mutual obligation of the two great powers to produce no such weapons, to radically reduce them or completely destroy them, and to view this as a step towards the comprehensive destruction of chemical weapons.

"There is no doubt that such a joint step from the USSR and the United States would have positive effects—for the speedy conclusion of the convention on the universal ban at the negotiations in Geneva, for the continuation of the disarmament process in toto and not least for the general climate in international relations. There is however no doubt either that a corresponding step in the center of Europe could be an extraordinary support for these efforts to the great powers," the paper writes. The proposal from the governments of the GDR and the CSSR, to create, on the path toward a global chemical weapons ban, a zone in central Europe which would already be free of these weapons, is on the table. Forces interested in continued arming are already proceeding to eradicate the chance which has arisen to eliminate this weapons category.

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND concludes: "Whoever wants to truly eliminate them and thereby the terrible dangers which their existence signifies in times of peace as well precisely for the people in densely populated Europe, that person is now called upon. Our offer to the FRG for negotiations is still available."

Shevardnadze-Baker Talks Deemed 'Significant'

LD2609155189 East Berlin Domestic Service in German 1350 GMT 25 Sep 89

[Guenter Leuschner commentary on the "Magazin am Nachmittag" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] In the not too distant past the West used to argue that nuclear disarmament would only make sense, if prior to it or simultaneously, at least, the Soviets would dismantle their superior tank forces. Conversely, there should be reason to assume then, that conventional disarmament can only bring actual disarmament, if it also covers nuclear weapons. The world would certainly fail to become a safer place with fewer tanks and more nuclear missiles instead. In order to avoid such fears, no weapons category must be left out in the talks and the negotiations under way in various places ought to proceed at an equal pace. A step-by-step approach in disarmament thus must not allow for any side involved to walk on just one leg, as it were.

However, that is exactly the impression NATO has created over the past 6 months. While advocating further progress in the Vienna negotiations and setting up a bold timetable, NATO avoided any engagement in further talks on short-range nuclear forces and did not allow any progress in the Geneva talks on chemical weapons and the cutting in half of strategic arms. Instead of submitting a similar timetable to conclude an agreement, four-fifths of which were ready for signing anyway, all that American politicians kept saying until very recently was that they were in no hurry, that they could afford and were willing to take their time. That uneven pace and contradiction in U.S. disarmament policy was even less justifiable, since no one had even the slightest doubt anymore over the Warsaw pact's readiness to accept drastic cuts in conventional weapons. [passage omitted]

It is against this backdrop that the results of the U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers meeting partly came as a surprise, because they convey the impression as though, despite all the statements saying otherwise given even in the most recent past, the United States was now willing to adjust its pace in the talks on chemical weapons and strategic arms in Vienna. If that were really the case, one could be satisified. But is it a true impression? The Soviet Union has once again made the largest step to achieve further rapprochement. However, the other Wyoming accords may also prove to be significant steps toward a long-awaited agreement, although any talk of a breakthrough would certainly be premature. The fact is that the United States has invested largely to make up for its bad record of acting as a brake in two out of three disarmaments talks. Whether that will be enough to conclude three really comprehensive disarmament agreements next year, remains to be seen, however.

Kessler Says Deterrence of War To Continue

LD2209170589 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1056 GMT 22 Sep 89

[Text] GDR Defense Minister Heinz Kessler has said that the most important concern of socialist armed forces is to continue, in line with the principles of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states and the GDR, to permit neither a nuclear nor a conventional war, and to protect the peoples and states of the socialist alliance from any kind of imperialist aggression.

The SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] politburo member told high-ranking officers at a commanders' meeting today that the important thing is still to deepen the fraternal alliance with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, and to ensure the necessary defensive capability.

Speaking of the campaign against the GDR by the FRG media and politicians, Army General Heinz Kessler said: "We will not be deterred from our successful path, and under the leadership of the party, together with all social

forces, we will continue to shape a developed socialist society as a process of continuity and renewal." The GDR will continue along the path of peaceful coexistence and preserve what has been achieved through cooperation.

U.S. Missile Inspectors Arrive in GDR

LD2109170689 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1600 GMT 21 Sep 89

[Text] A U.S. inspection group arrived in the GDR today. The total of 10 inspectors was received at Leipzig-Schkeuditz airport by representatives from the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the GDR Ministry of National Defense, and the Soviet Army. In one of the six former missile bases on GDR territory, the U.S. inspectors are to check that the INF Treaty is being adhered to.

The GDR will support this measure also, in accordance with the trilateral agreement between the GDR, the USSR, and the CSSR on inspections in connection with the INF Treaty.

HUNGARY

Minister Karpati Discusses Role of Armed Forces

LD2809133989 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 0800 GMT 28 Sep 89

[Relay of Hungarian National Assembly session in Budapest on 28 September on interpellation by deputy Erno Raffay to Hungarian Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati—live]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

[Acting speaker Mrs. Robert Jakab] Our fellow deputy Dr Erno Raffay will make an interpellation to the defense minister on the matter of military political issues. My fellow deputy Dr Erno Raffay has leave to speak.

[Raffay] Esteemed house, esteemed minister of defense. The interpellation which I address to you consists of four points. The four points are connected with one another. They are all issues of military politics.

The first point: In the present internal and external political situation, which is extremely heightened, certain neighboring countries, observing the domestic political changes in Hungary and Hungary's latest foreign political initiatives, are not deterred even from political blackmail and military threats. It is particularly important to safeguard under all circumstances the defense strength of the People's Defense Army—or rather of the Hungarian People's Army as it is still called. What I ask, Mr minister, is whether the army's defense strength and intactness can be guaranteed, and if so in what way—in today's internal political conditions, which all of us know—with special regard to the economic restrictions affecting the army?

The second point of my interpellation is as follows: General Jozsef Pacsek, head of the army's chief of staff, on 19th of this month stated before staff members of the press—and no doubt you all read this in the papers on the 20th—that we have to regard as an alarming rumor the military action aimed against Hungary by our Romanian ally—I said it in quotation marks, though legally there is no doubt about it. The chief of staff stated verbatim, and I quote: Trust between the Hungarian and Romanian military leadership is unbroken; relations are continuous. End quote. Knowing who is, or rather who are, the commanders of the Romanian armed forces, I ask you, Mr. Minister, to be so kind as to explain what is meant by the statement of the chief of staff about this certain unbroken trust, and in what specific ways does this show?

I have another question here: I have become the deputy to the population living along the Romanian border. Alluding to the constant enquiry of this population, I ask whether the Hungarian military leadership has taken the necessary measures to counterbalance an eventual Romanian military invasion? There was one such in 1916, which the Hungarian military leadership had not been counting on.

The third point of my interpellation goes like this: The countries of the Warsaw Pact have today stepped onto different political paths, and debates are being conducted on this matter even at the highest levels. I consider it very essential what standpoint is taken by the Warsaw Pact's military leadership in regard to the present political situation in Central Europe. I ask the defense minister to give an account to the National Assembly, if possible, as to what positions—be it leading positions, in any case what possibilities for a say—does the Hungarian Army have within the Warsaw Pact.

When I read out the fourth point of my interpellation, I think once again there will be murmurings in the hall. According to the knowledge of the country's population, the last time the Hungarian Army was used outside the country's borders was in 1968, in overrunning [lerohanas] Czechoslovakia. According to certain reports, because such have reached me as well, Hungarian soldiers are supposed to have taken part, since then as well—first and foremost in the Far Eastern theaters of war—in keen [eles] battles. Does this information accord with the truth? Thank you very much.

[Jakab] Ferenc Karpati, minister of defense, replies to the interpellation.

[Karpati] Esteemed National Assembly. Our fellow deputy Raffay has posed questions concerning foreign policy, strongly concerning foreign policy, and questions concerning military policy. Naturally, these questions are closely interconnected, thus I will in fact only allude to the foreign political part.

I would like to correct his remark: in a heightened foreign political situation, by saying that, in my view, we are seeing precisely tendencies toward detente, and we

hope that this will continue. But it shines out from his question that he is not thinking about generally heightened foreign politics, but about neighboring countries—and only some of them, at that.

The polemics and problems, already existing ones and new ones, are known. The chosen path which we have proclaimed in Hungary which we are creating with cardinal laws, the change of model, and the introduction of radical reforms, naturally this has not started in every allied country. There are divergences.

However, the problems do not appear in an identical way in every country. It is well known that in the GDR they appear on account of tourism, in Czechoslovakia they are due to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros [water barrage]. And the situation is different with Romania, which extends back over a longer period, and unfortunately the relations between the two countries have become heightened.

This is primarily because of the rough violation of human rights, of nationality rights, in Romania; the forced assimilation, which has likewise accelerated; the destruction of villages, and finally, the large numbers of refugees, among whom one can find citizens not only of Hungarian nationality, but also many of Romanian nationality and mother tongue.

This has indeed created a very heightened situation between the two countries. Nor has the situation improved recently either. We consider that our country's consistent activity and efforts to ensure that relations between the two countries should be settled by political means, that this is the correct, the only correct, the treadable path.

On the basis of this we can see that big important international organizations, and international public opinion in general as well, are more and more raising their voices; they support us. Only recently, yesterday to be precise, we heard that the European Council wants to find out for itself the facts of the Romanian situation.

With regard to the military threat, I would like to say that we are not now living the times of the beginning of the century here in Europe, in no respect whatever. Certain pronouncements cannot prompt us to take immediate steps which could perhaps be followed immediately by countersteps, thus causing an escalation. This must be avoided!

However, the government, the National Assembly, and within this the military leadership, have a very serious and great responsibility in this regard, which is that they should keep in view precise military factors which accord with the demands of the prsent age, and that they should have continuous and reliable knowledge of them. For this we have every condition and possibility at our disposal. Today's tools are very modern tools for this.

If it pleases the National Assembly, I state with responsibility that so far we have seen no reason why, in this regard, we should have taken a step in the military field which would bring in its wake a more stepped-up preparedness in contrast to those hitherto. As long as we see no reason for such a step, I would like to stress that we have to avoid it.

One wonders, in that case, how one is to judge the situation between the two countries in this military context. I have been wondering, so that I would not have to enter into a lengthy explanation, how I could make our relationship understandable. When relations are so tense between the two countries, it is natural that relations are cooler in the military sphere as well.

We have for many years had an invitation for the top military leadership to visit Romania. A few years ago we thought that perhaps it would be expedient to take up the invitation, hoping that the situation would take a turn for the better. So we postponed it. Today, on the other hand, we are expressly of the opinion that the present time is not suitable for a visit.

I think that I have sufficiently intimated that relations really are cool between the military as well.

We belong to one alliance and we have common tasks. We have a common task in safeguarding the airspace; We have a common task in performing various military tasks. Just as cooperation is good in the spheres of the economy and of trade, I have to say that cooperation is also undisturbed in regard to the development, acquisition, and manufacture of military technology.

It is in this respect, and not between soldiers, that the dispute is taking place between the two countries. It was in this respect that the head of our chief of staff made his statement, that there is no hitch in the performance of the tasks, which of course are very important, especially in regard to air defense.

Otherwise, on the question of what kind of pronouncements are made by a few persons, a few leaders, our opinion is that we do not necessarily have to make an absolute generalization from these.

In today's news we heard, and we could read in the papers, Ilie Ceausescu's latest invectives. We know him. He describes himself as a historian. He is extremely productive. Papers pour forth from his pen. We know all of them precisely. A few years ago, when he was here in our Military History Museum, he objected to the display of early maps. I asked him: Well, if you are an historian, should we repaint them? History cannot be repainted. I judge him to be an historian whose writing, in the large mass of his works, is unhistorical, untruthful, and abusive. That which we can read also in today's papers is offensive.

According to my experiences, however, they should not be generalized.

I am pleased that my fellow deputy has broached the issue—since I have to say that it is a rarity nowadays—of how the intactness of the Hungarian People's Army can

be judged after the large-scale budget deductions. I imagine that you will not be suprised at my answer. These large-scale deductions, deductions to date to the tune of 18 percent of what is earmarked in our current 5-year plan, have of course raised an enormous number of problems and difficulties. This is very considerable—not to mention inflation, which is extra. If we add it, then this skimming of funds is considerably more.

I consider it necessary to inform the National Assembly that with regard to this matter, it is not a juggling act that we have implemented. We have taken it as our point of departure that when the allocations were worked out for this 5-year plan—military technology development, modernization, and figuring among these were devices that also accorded with the previous conception—the abandoning of these constituted the least problem. If such a situation had not developed in the country, with all certainty there would have still been talk of abandoning very many such devices. A great proportion sensitively affected the Hungarian Army. It was necessary to postpone—I should like to stress not once and for all but temporarily—devices which are absolutely necessary in the interest of the army's military calibre, because it was necessary to replace obsolete devices, aircraft, transport devices, and telecommunications devices. We cannot continue this postponement for too long, because this would impinge on the army's combat readiness.

These already give rise to problems and difficulties at present too. If things were to be prolonged for very long it would be a serious problem. Now it is still bearable.

It has been necessary to effect considerable measures which caution us to being thrifty in the spheres of preparation and training. I have to say that it is not cheap to carry out a live firing exercise; it costs several hundreds of millions [currency not specified]. To abandon it cannot be done forever. Such thriftiness however is now taking place.

What has most sensitively affected the army, although we have taken great care regarding this, is the improvement of the force's service and living conditions. Please, I do not want to go into this in detail. Yesterday, I very attentively listened to the point raised by our fellow deputy regarding the issue of payment, or taxation, of obligatory overtime work. In order not to mislead, what occurred to me was that since I have been an officer in this army, the army's officers have always worked overtime, not just to any degree. Of course, it is said that this is what is entailed, but there is a normal limit to this, too.

They go for weeks on exercises and on our Varpalota exercise ground; even during the hottest summer the wind goes through one's bones and they are far away from their families. With our current tools, it is not possible to carry out every task on Hungarian territory—I shall raise the point that missile live firing maneuvers can only be carried out by us on the endless steppes of Kazakhstan—and they are away for long weeks. There is no kind of compensation for their being away and being under such demands.

In answer to the question of whether the Hungarian Army is intact: it is intact. I can tell the National Assembly this with responsibility. Our present equipment and weapons are appropriate for this. As I have said, what we have prepared for cannot be abandoned for a long time. However, I would like to tell the National Assembly that the main basis for the Hungarian Army being intact is our professional force. Their devotion, their readiness to make sacrifices in the interest of defending this people, this homeland, remains unbroken. Although they do without many things, although they have to renounce many things, they accept and complete their tasks. The spirit of the army is good, its discipline and degree of organization is high.

I am saying this not because we are now coming up to Armed Forces' Day; I am safely telling the National Assembly that our people can trust the Hungarian Army.

What is our role in the Warsaw Pact? How can we have a say in it? The Warsaw Pact organization is not only a military, grouping, it is also a political and military alliance. Its highest body is made up of the highest political-state leaderships of the individual member countries, at which basic decisions can be passed—like now in the summer, for example. With regard to the military organization itself, the Warsaw Pact consists of sovereign countries. Without the government, no decision concering the Hungarian Army can be made anywhere.

Regarding the fellow deputy's question, I imagine that something quite concrete and tangible lies behind the question of why this matter arose at all. I imagine that problems stemming from earlier times may lie here. Please note that there are basic changes as regards perception as well, concerning which the chariman of our delegation, Comrade Rezso Nyers, said very clearly and unequivocally at the Bucharest consultation: The Brezhnev doctrine has ceased to exist, once and for all. It has ceased to exist because of the transformation process, which we greatly welcome and support, which is taking place in the Soviet Union and in several other countries, too.

Thus, as a sovereign country, the Hungarian Government is in command of the Hungarian national army. Figuring in the cardinal laws are new formulations—which we shall discuss—in the amendment to the Constitution, where Parliament's say and its decision will considerably increase. Well, that is for the future, but I can safely state now that we can build on it.

As to the fourth point: I was not (?ready) for it, that is true. Well, I can say that it is without foundation. It is not proper for the minister to ask whether you believe these allegations, but the question has arisen and it is my duty to reply.

The question of whether Hungarian soldiers are taking part in fighting in the Far East, does not cause the most pleasure, and I imagine that this affects the Hungarian Government and the military leadership quite badly. The concept of Far East is broad; it covers many countries. Fighting is not going on everywhere, nor shall I ask which country you are thinking of. I can say that in the past, many years ago, on the basis of the Paris decision and by request, Hungarian officers participated in the supervisory committee in Vietnam. They did not take part in fighting, but at international request, they were meeting their obligation.

At present, at the request of the United Nations, some are active in Iraq as UN soldiers, in the interest of peace, where as supervisors, they are meeting their obligations.

I reiterate that this supposition is a little hurtful, but since many things have arisen today I thought it was necessary to ask the fellow-deputy and the National Assembly to accept my reply. [applause]

[Jakab] I thank the minister for his exhaustive reply. I now ask fellow-deputy Dr Erno Raffay whether he accepts the minister's reply?

[Raffay] I thank the minister for his reply. It was exhaustive, although I expected more details regarding the third point, the Warsaw Pact. Regarding the fourth point, I have to say that—I said this yesterday, by the way—causing offense and hurt is far from my intention. Many people had asked me this, and I decided to put the question. I have now been given the reply. I accept all four points of the reply. Thank you.

[Jakab] I ask whether the National Assembly accepts the minister's reply. Please vote. I declare the decision: the deputy who made the interpellation agreed with the minister's reply. The National Assembly has accepted the reply with 313 votes in favor, 2 against, and 6 abstentions. [applause] [passage omitted]

Bush's UNGA Remarks Deemed 'Very Important'

LD2509224289 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2100 GMT 25 Sep 89

[Text] [Announcer] Gyorgy Bolgar reports from New York.

[Bolgar] The U.S. President delivered a very optimistic speech at the UN, valuing highly the progress manifested in Soviet-U.S. relations, the very important role of the world organization, and, first and foremost, the spread of the ideals of freedom and democracy, at this point first highlighting and naming Hungary. I do not know how much of a role sequence has in diplomacy, but hearing them as a Hungarian, I felt that Bush's words were very important.

The spread of freedom is apparent everywhere, said Bush. Thus, in Central Europe—yes, that is the label he used, Central Europe—in Hungary, where a stagnating society has swung into motion and is progressing towards political pluralism and a free market economy, where they have dismantled the barrier which once unnaturally, by force, separated Hungary from the West. Yes, they have dismantled it, reiterated the President, and they have replaced it with faith in the future.

Bush then mentioned Poland and the Soviet Union, and he also dwelt on other parts of the world, so as later to sum up developments as follows: We are witnessing the collapse of the idea of totalitarianism. In the spirit of this optimism, the U.S. President reported on the results of the most recent Soviet-U.S. talks, saying that he was very satisfied with the progress, he awaited the summit with Gorbachev, but he felt that even more important was the Soviet Union's new attitude, that it is ready to discuss frankly the most difficult issues. In conclusion, Bush made a concrete proposal, primarily to the USSR, but also to the more than 20 countries which have chemical weapons, or are able to produce them. As he said, the United States is willing, in 8 years, to destroy 98 percent of its chemical weapons if the USSR does the same. In 10 years it would destroy them all, if they sign the international agreement banning chemical weapons, and it is willing even to start destroying them now, without an agreement, if the USSR is ready to reduce its stocks of chemical weapons to the same level.

Obviously, the USSR will favorably receive the proposal; the question is whether the stocks of weapons are really the same, according to both countries.

ROMANIA

Balkans Without Foreign Military Bases Favored

AU2809172989 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1719 GMT 28 Sep 89

["Creation of a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the Balkans as Part of Security and Cooperation in Europe and the World"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] By promoting a foreign policy of broad cooperation, Romania has paid special attention to the ensurance of a climate of peace, security and fruitful cooperation in the Balkans, "ROMANIA LIBERA" writes in a foreign news commentary of 28 September. For the attainment of this goal, the newspaper shows, Romania starts from the general idea that the basis for a fruitful cooperation of the Balkan states, like all the states of the world, should firmly be the principles of equality, respect for national sovereignty and independence, noninterference in domestic affairs, nonrecourse to the threat and use of force, the settlement of all disputed problems by peaceful ways, and by negotiations only.

By taking action on that line, Romania has managed to build good relations with all the Balkan states. A decisive role in the manifold development of Romania's ties with the other states in the region was played by President Nicolae Ceausescu's frequent meetings and talks with the leaders of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey in

Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Athens and Ankara, which added scope to traditional relationships, opening up new prospects and giving an impact to inter-Balkan cooperation. During the summits, Romania steadfastly supported the idea of frequent meetings and contacts at all levels.

Romania, and President Nicolae Ceausescu, promoted broad initiatives, tabled many proposals for the elimination of nuclear arms in the area, and for the Balkans to become a nuclear weapon-free zone. Romania takes the view that the creation of such a nuclear arms-free zone would go down as a specific contribution of the Balkan states to the restriction of the area where these means of destruction are deployed, and would set an example for similar measures to be taken also in other parts of the globe. Romania takes the view that, to begin with, concerns could materialize in options of the Balkan states on the territory of which such arms are stationed not to deploy new ones or allow their modernization. Romania is of the opinion that the adoption of a solemn declaration of all states in the region not to produce, not to possess and not to buy chemical arms, as well as an agreement to cut back on conventional arms, military spending and budgets could help confidence-building and enhance the security of states. Understandings apt to reduce and eventually dismantle foreign military bases would also have a positive effect.

By taking action to strengthen peace and security in the Balkans, Romania works for the entrenchment of manifold cooperative relations that stimulate understanding and a durable cooperation. In the economic field, important documents were concluded by Romania with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Albania, which give relations both stability and perspective. Against this background, Romania's cooperation with the Balkan countries ranges all the way from the complex use of the power potential of the Danube and cooperation in key branches of technology such as machine building, electronics, electrical engineering, chemical engineering, to the joint building of economic units of mutual interest in the steel, power or mining industries. Romania is firmly for the development of modern forms of cooperation, lower customs duties, cooperation on third markets, the establishment of joint companies, a growing cooperation in communications, and transport optimization, including waterways. In Romania's view, in the economic and technological potential of the Balkan states, their similar or close concerns with the implementation of socioeconomic development programmes are a serious reserve that has not been exhausted.

In approaching all these aspects, Romania starts from the idea that the Balkan states, beyond their different social system, and membership of different military blocs or alliances, have common interests related to the economic and social progress of every one, which calls for neighbourhood and geographic proximity, and long-time traditional links to be used to advantage.

Romania has made an important contribution to inter-Balkan meetings. A recent one was held in Bucharest at ministerial level on the theme of industrial cooperation and transfer of technology. It was preceded by the Balkan foreign ministerial meeting in Belgrade, by meetings of the representatives of the ministries of tourism, transport, the economy, and foreign trade, as well as expert meetings on various questions.

Along the same line, Romania put forward the proposal for a Balkan summit. Should this initiative materialize, it would enable the discussion of new measures to overcome the existing problems, build up confidence and increase cooperation. Assessing a summit meeting as topical, Romania takes the view that some problems that exist between Balkan countries should not be overdramatized. The starting point should be the idea that each Balkan country, like those around the world should sort out its own problems in freedom and independence, and that the people of the respective country alone can judge if a problem has been solved well or not.

Inter-Balkan cooperation can, in Romania's view, assume greater importance if it is extended to the whole of Europe and even beyond, to enable the adoption of measures promoting a faster pace of international cooperation in the economy and other areas, for the removal of all kinds of pressure and political conditioning, of all barriers to growing economic relations, and of the threats to world stability.

Proposals at Vienna Arms Talks Reviewed

AU2509192489 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1814 GMT 25 Sep 89

["For the Achievement of Accords Meeting Requirements of European Disarmament and Security"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Actively participating in the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces, Romania works for the achievement of disarmament, confidence and security-building in the European continent. In this framework, the Romanian proposals envisage a military balance at ever lower levels so that the European states should retain armed forces and conventional armaments for defense only. Pursuing this basic goal, these proposals refer to 50 per cent cuts in the troops of the two military alliances until the year 2000, in a differentiated way, considering each country's number of troops in parallel with 50 per cent cuts in their military spending; reductions should be made by stages and states should pledge not to use the means thus released for other military purposes, but in peaceful economic and social fields.

In connection with the talks in new confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, which parallel the talks on troops and conventional armaments, Romania is of the opinion, in order to help implement the first accords already next year, responsible factors of the two alliances should hold discussion in seminars on military doctrines to approach constructively concrete aspects of

their military policies, the necessary adjustments to be made in the specific conditions after the reductions. In this respect, they should not discuss academically, but deal with practical aspects relative to the organization and location of military forces which make them offensive or defensive.

The Romanian proposals put forward so far in this forum also cover the limitation of military activities, the creation of security corridors and areas between states and military alliances, the prevention of nuclear accidents, the improvement of communication, contacts and interstate consultations, the extension of confidence and security measures to the activity of air and naval forces. Romania also states for exchanges of military information and improvement of notification, observation and verification procedures, building on the Stockholm documents and other measures, mostly for the limitation of military activities in Europe.

Considering that the two sets of talks in Vienna are obviously interdependent, Romania reminds the participants that they should agree on and carry into effect efficient measures to strengthen security, confidence and cooperation in a Europe free of armaments, of military aggression and threats. Romania takes the view that one set of talks should not depend on the other's results, but the two sets of negotiations should proceed in parallel and influence each other, so as to strengthen stability and security in Europe, achieve a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, at lower levels through the elimination of disparities and of the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action and the consolidation of confidence and security of all nations in the continent.

INDIA

Developments in Controversy Over Chemical Exports

Ban Not Acceptable

46001574z Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 12 Jul 89 p 1

[Article: "Chemical Ban on India Not Acceptable"]

[Text] New Delhi, July 11—India today accused the western countries of trying to force it to accept a ban on the manufacture of certain chemicals while they themselves refused to ban their manufacture.

Responding to queries on the export of a certain chemical by India which allegedly went into the manufacture of chemical weapons in Iran, a foreign office spokesperson said here today that the chemical in question, thionyl chloride, was not a banned item in India because it was also used to make pesticides.

He said that the ship carrying the chemical had already returned to India with the consignment. New Delhi did not attach much importance to this incident as it viewed it as a matter which concerned two firms—a West German firm which wanted to import the chemical and an Indian firm which exported it.

India was not amused by the noise that had been raised over the episode in Western countries. On its part, India was in favour of a comprehensive ban on the manufacture, stockpiling and deployment of chemical weapons. But it would not accept a partial ban.

Official sources described the West's effort to force India to ban the chemical as a "discriminatory nonproliferation treaty in chemicals." They said the irony was that several obstacles were being placed in the way of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons by those very countries which were pressing India for a partial ban.

Transpek Executive's Remarks

46001574z Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 16 Jul 89 p 7

[Article: "No Law Broken in Chemical Export"]

[Text] Baroda, July 15—The Transpek industry limited, Baroda, at the centre of a controversy over the return of a shipment of thionyl chloride from Dubai, has claimed that the company was absolutely in the clear as it had not struck any deal with an intermediary firm in West Germany.

Mr Paresh Saraiya, the vice-president (marketing and development) of Transpek stated here yesterday that the company had not violated any law of the land as chemical was not in the list of banned ones. It was also unaware of any shipment of the chemicals from Sharjah to West Germany.

The ship carrying 120 tonnes of thionyl chloride destined to Sharjah, was returned to Bombay from Dubai last week, on the ground that the shipment of the chemical to West Germany was illegal as it had recently been brought under the list of banned chemicals in that country. Transpek was also accused by some countries of indirectly helping Iran to manufacture chemical weapons with thionyl chloride, which was reportedly finding its way to Iran from Sharjah.

Mr Saraiya said the foreign office spokesman of the government of India had already issued a clean chit to the company. But the spokesman was wrong in saying that the deal was between Transpek and a firm in West Germany. Technically, the deal was between Transpek and M/s Shattaf General Trading, Sharjah, which, in turn, apparently sold the chemical to M/s Rheinsen chemical products GnbH, Dusseldorf, West Germany.

He said Transpek had received an order for supply of 257 tonnes of thionyl chloride from the Sharjah firm, of which 120 tonnes were despatched. As far as Iran was concerned, 60 tonnes of the chemical was supplied to it through the State Trading Corporation of India in March this year.

Set up in 1965, Transpek manufactures about a dozen chemicals, of which thionyl chloride constitutes a mere 11.5 per cent of its total sales.

Thionyl chloride has wide applications in pharmaceuticals, dye-stuff and agro-chemicals industries, and is also used as a general chlorinating agent. Transpek is one of the three manufacturers of the chemicals in the country which, earlier, was imported from West Germany, the United States, Switzerland and Japan. Only recently, West Germany imposed a ban on trading in the chemical.

According to Mr Saraiya, there were several users of thionyl chloride in the country from pharmaceutical dye-stuff and agro-chemical industries but no known user manufacturing dangerous chemicals.

Anger Called 'Justifiable'

46001574z Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 22 Jul 89 p 12

[Editorial: "Unacceptable Hypocrisy"]

[Text] The Indian embassy in Washington has reacted with justifiable anger to criticisms emanating from the Bush administration about India's export of so-called poison gas. Unfortunately, the state department's official spokesman, Mr Boucher, has not seen fit to reject this slur categorically. A West German chemical company was contracted by Iran to supply thionyl chloride which is used for pesticide production. It is also a component of mustard gas. After enquiries by the West German government, the company cancelled its contract with Indian suppliers and both have seen fit to pass on the buck, as it were, to India arguing that this country should have

more stringent laws concerning such items, the export of which is prohibited by West Germany. This issue has been picked up in Washington as part of its purported drive to make the world free of chemical weapons.

For a number of reasons this challenge to Indian *bona fides* is disturbing and unacceptable. This country's record on the issue of non-proliferation of chemical weapons and opposition to such means of warfare is second to none. India's positive and constructive role in seeking to perfect a system of worldwide control in this matter has been commended repeatedly, even by the west. There are a number of dual-use chemicals like thionyl chloride whose purchase may be motivated by considerations unknown to the supplier. But to single out Indian laxity is really to try and bell the wrong cat. Take the accusation about Indian supply of such poison gas for use in the Iran-Iraq war. Both politically and economically, western positions on this war contrasted negatively with India's principled stand of strict neutrality and its refusal either to encourage or turn a blind eye to any efforts by Indian companies to make money out of the lucrative weapons trade. The western record in this respect was far worse. If dual use chemicals constitute a problem, and they do, the issue must be tackled in a comprehensive and equitable manner which does not single out a country like India. Indeed, a minimum condition for movement in this diction would be much greater information about the production, stockpiling and use of such chemicals in the west and much less secrecy about laboratory research with respect to militarily useful gases and chemicals. This would be to put the boot on the foot where it belongs.

Country's Progress in Missile Development Reported

'Agni' Director's Interview

46001515z New Delhi PATRIOT in English 16 Jun 89 p 6

[Article by Sudhanshu Mishra]

[Text] Jaipur, 15 Jun—India has the capacity to develop the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, says Project Director of 'Agni' R. N. Aggarwal.

In an exclusive interview to PATRIOT, he said, however, much groundwork needed to be done.

About "Agni," the surface-to-surface missile launched last fortnight from Chandipur-on-sea, Mr Aggarwal said it had simply been a technology demonstration."

Mr Aggarwal, who has headed the project since its inception in 1983, said 'Agni' had in fact not completed its work. What had been demonstrated so far was only a single flight as 'technology demonstrator.' More flights were in the offing, he added.

Agni was part of the integrated missile programme constituting "Prithvi," "Trishul," "Aakash" and the anti-tank missile "Naag." But he declined to comment on which missile involved more sophisticated technology. All missiles were the most modern, which were still on the drawing boards of several developed countries, including the United States, he said.

Mr Aggarwal said "Agni" had opened boundless possibilities for the long-range missiles system. If the country needed such delivery systems, it could be made available, he added.

On a purely indigenous footing, one could talk of sophisticated missiles, he pointed out.

He informed that preparations were on for the second experiment of the "Prithvi" missile and work on all of its sub-systems. The missile's minimum range was 250 km and could be placed at par with the latest missiles of the two Superpowers.

He also hoped that the short-range missile "Trishul" would be introduced in the Indian Army by 1993.

Work on these missiles was on in the Defence Research and Development Organisation [DRDO]. Another land-to-air missile "Aakash" had already been experimented successfully. The third-generation anti-tank missile "Naag" based on infra-red system was also nearly completed.

He lauded the various scientific institutions, laboratories, the economy and industry of the country besides the 400 scientists of DRDL [Defence Research Development Laboratory] for making 'Agni' a reality.

Help to Space Research

46001515z Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 16 Jun 89 p 5

[Text] New Delhi, 15 Jun (PTI)—The re-entry technology demonstrated during Agni's maiden flight on 22 May will have spinoffs in civilian space research, defence scientists have predicted.

Indian space scientists can use the re-entry technology to retrieve objects ejected from orbiting satellites, according to the Agni missile designer, Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam.

For instance, photographs taken by reconnaissance satellites or other experimental cargo can be safely returned to earth, and the re-entry technology will also enable India [to] build space capsules for bringing back humans in case of a manned space flight in future.

Agni's main mission was to test the ability of the first Indian-made heatshield to withstand the high temperature during atmospheric re-entry. Made of carbon composite, the heatshield is meant to protect warhead, but can also be used for safe return of perishable objects ejected from orbiting satellites.

Dr Kalam and his colleagues said the three-metre-long heatshield, Agni's vital payload, was not recovered after

it splashed into the sea but data telemetred by the missile showed that it behaved well.

Dr Kalam said data sent back during the re-entry phase showed that temperature inside the shield was at 40ßDC, while that of the surface rose to a peak of 3,000ßDC at an altitude of 12 km.

Recovery of the heatshield was not part of the plan during Agni's maiden launch, Dr Kalam said. He said the payload recovery would be attempted during the next test flight that will take at least six months from now.

A special parachute is being designed by a defence institute in Agra for decelerating the payload before splashdown during the next flight. Dr Kalam said recovery of the heatshield and its physical examination would enable scientists to standardise its design.

Dr Kalam, who has left on an undisclosed mission abroad, said two more flights were planned for Agni. "The decision for regular production will have to be made at the political level," he said.

Meanwhile, preparations are on in full swing at the Defence Research Development Laboratory (DRDL) for the maiden launch of Akash, a surface-to-air missile and the second test flight of Prithvi, a 250-km range surface-to-surface missile.

Scientists said Akash would demonstrate the indigenously developed ram-jet technology. Prithvi, first test-flown in 1988, would use a miniaturised inertial navigation system during its second flight.

Scientists said they had also collected data on the destructive power of Prithvi's warhead by actually exploding the warhead in special containment facilities at the DRDL.

Simultaneously with developmental flights, the Prithvi missile has entered production at the neighbouring Bharat Dynamic Limited under what is described as the "concurrent production programme."

Dr Kalam said most of the missile development activities had shifted from the DRDL to the newly-established Research Centre Immarat (RCI) complex, 6 km away. The sprawling Rs 1000 million RCI complex has been set up for developing advanced missile technologies in cooperation with university scientists.

The Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) has also launched a major drive to attract young talent to work on missiles and computer science, Dr Kalam said.

Every year, 30 graduate engineers are given fellowships for masters degrees while working at the DRDO, and at least seven universities have been provided with computers to train engineers.

Missile Project Consortium

46001515z Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 10 Jun 89 p 4

[Text] Bangalore, 9 Jun—The Defence Ministry has formed a consortium to design, develop and produce all key components of the guided missile project. It is feared that last month's successful launch of the country's first intermediate range ballistic missile, Agni, might lead to a blockade in supply of the crucial components from abroad.

Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, father of the integrated guided missile programme and the brain behind the successful launch of the Agni, said today, "Now we have been marked (by the countries from whom we imported components for our guided missile project). But we have already identified all critical components—about 15 of them—and formed consortia of industries, research laboratories and scientific institutions which will design, develop and mass produce these components. If we face difficulties in obtaining these components, we have already taken care of them."

Dr Abdul Kalam said that the largescale integrated chips, which accounted for five percent of the total imported components, in the Agni missile, were flowing in without a hitch at the moment. But the country was already in the process of manufacturing a 32-bit chip which would make the missile project self-sufficient. "This is just so that nobody strangles our project," Dr Abdul Kalam said. Dr Kalam was speaking on the Agni mission at a foundation day lecture of the National Aeronautical Laboratory here.

Dr Kalam said the missile launching operation would soon be converted into a mobile one. "Now the missiles are being launched from a fixed launcher but we are developing a mobile launcher" Dr Kalam revealed. The mobile launcher would be tried out soon but for now scientists were satisfied with the success of the re-entry technology which was one of the major objectives of the Agni mission. The heat shield of the Agni missile, which had proved capable of withstanding temperatures between 40ßDC and 400ßDC was a breakthrough in design and fabrication, he said.

The Agni mission has, for the first time, in the guided missile project, been monitored by a networking communication system, Dr Kalam revealed. The trajectory of the Agni flight was tracked simultaneously by two radars at the intermediate test range (itr) at Balasore, three telemetry system at the Istrac centre in Car Nicobar islands, one radar and one telemetry system at Shar and three telemeoric stations located on Indian naval ships. They monitored the missile at its impact point in the sea. "All these were linked to the satellite communication network. This came in very handy. For the first time a networking of multiple ranges was established," Dr Kalam said.

Dr Kalam said the accuracy of Agni, which was a range off 1000 to 2500 km depending on the type of payload it carries, was absolute. "As Dr Arunachalam (scientific adviser to the defence minister) has already said the missile is embarrassingly accurate." He said that even if the missile deviated, the error was minimised by the explicit guidance system. The variation could be set right by the onboard computer by altering the trajectory.

Dr Kalam said that the breakthrough heat shield technology was not yet ready for sale. The technology has made India and its scientists proud, Dr Kalam said. "The heat shield technology, its design, development, testing and qualification methods are all our own."

Speaking on the problems encountered during the design and development stages of the Agni mission, Dr Kalam said the missile launch had to be put off twice because of temporary setbacks. Even as the missile was mounted on its launch pad ready for the launch in April, the computer has gone into a "hold" unable to manage the 50-odd operations demanded of it.

Production of Missile Devices

46001515z Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 14 Jun 89 p 5

[Article by S. Srinivasan]

[Text] New Delhi, 13 Jun—The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is working on a programme for manufacturing semiconductors and solid state devices for its missile project.

The solid state physics laboratory, one of the defence establishments involved in the research activity on electronic devices, is developing sophisticated chips for electronic scanning antennas, missile guidance, aircraft sensors and laser detection equipment. The laboratory has also undertaken a project for development of night vision equipment.

The traditional semiconductor material is silicon-based, but for specialised defence applications gallium arsenide technology is being developed as it has significant advantages. This chip has high-speed integrated circuits where electrons could move at much faster speeds than normal silicon chips, thus opening up a large avenue for applications. It also enjoys the characteristic of high radiation tolerance and could perform well on a wide temperature range.

The radars have worked on radio waves for ages but with enormous advances in the field, modern air defence and missile systems employ millimetre and infra-red waves. The short waves with 2 mm to 3 mm wavelength have very high frequency and could travel long distances. Now, with the help of infra-red band, the defence laboratories are developing thermal imaging systems which give the contour and shape of a distant object at night. The system works on the principle that all objects, and especially tanks and other armoured vehicles, emit radiation. The sensor on missiles will detect this temperature difference to an accuracy of 0.5 degree Celsius to the atmosphere and home in on the target. The laboratories are developing the device for the indigenous third-generation anti-tank missile, Nag. This missile, similar to the U.S. Trigard, will have more than 10,000 detectors on a single chip.

The laboratory is developing a phased array radar for the medium-range missile, Akash, which has already been successfully testfired. This type of antenna scans the sky on a wide range and can also engage multiple targets for the missile. Speed is certainly a characteristic of the system and it can calculate hundreds of target locations per hour and can follow several enemy projectiles at the same time.

As it is well known that the chip is an integrated circuit equivalent to many transistors, its miniaturisation is one of the most daunting jobs. The solid state physics laboratory is working on chips which have more than 60,000 transistors. The laboratory has successfully grown large mercury cadmium telluride and gallium arsenide crystals from which small pieces are chipped out on which circuits are etched.

The mercury cadmium telluride is a laser material used for development of laser crystals. The laboratory, under its four-year project, has already grown over 15 crystals. The development of crystals is a time-consuming job. It takes more than a month for a single crystal to grow and it could cost over $900 if imported. The laboratory, which has only R and D facilities, expects to pass on the production job to Bharat Electronics Ltd. sometime in future.

The laboratory is planning to initiate work in solid state photomultipliers, new sources in microwave and mm wave regions, optical computer elements and other such sophisticated areas.

Nonproliferation: U.S. Actions, Policies Criticized

BK0908113589 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES in English 31 Jul 89 p 13

[K. Subrahmanyam article entitled "U.S. at the Old Game"]

[Text] In 1974, following the Pokharan nuclear test the United States, Canada and other Western countries joined together in applying pressure on India to discontinue the nuclear tests. The Indian leadership buckled under the pressure and discontinued further testing. Encouraged by that precedent, the United States Administration presumably is attempting to repeat that exercise and this time try to dissuade India from continuing further tests of Agni missile. Given our past record one cannot blame the U.S. Administration and the senators from making their attempts. One hopes that India of 1989 is not the India of 1974 and this time the country

will be able to rebuff such monopolistic approach of some dominant powers arrogantly establishing the doctrine that missiles and sophisticated technologies are to be controlled solely by them and the developing nations are to be prevented by various means from catching up with them in technology. In their attempt, with their control of world-wide mass media a significant amount of disinformation has been generated to mislead both the American people and the rest of the world.

The United States built its atom bomb with the help of dozens of emigre scientists who fled from Europe. So was the case with the hydrogen bomb. The U.S. missile program was initiated by a famous Chinese scientist Dr Qian Xuesen who as a colonel in the U.S. Army recruited all the talented German rocket scientists from the Peenemunde establishments in Germany at the end of the Second World War to build missiles for the U.S. This included Dr Werner von Braun who launched the manned mission to moon. It also included a number of ex-Nazis whom the U.S. protected and shielded. Even today the U.S. has borrowed the Soviet technology for their neutral particle beam [term as published] for their Star Wars.

Given this background it is amusing to read about some U.S. congressmen and so-called experts talking of India having obtained technology for its missile from abroad. One expert even talked of the Agni's nose cone resembling the German one. So far only German missiles have been fired by the Germans who worked in the missile and space programs of the United States and Germany by itself has no independent missile program.

Now comes the announcement that U.S. would not sell to India combined acceleration and vibration climatic test system (CAVCTS) in order to prevent this country from developing missiles. This reminds one of a Tamil proverb about a cantankerous person hiding the comb of the bride with the object of preventing the marriage from taking place. The engineering firms in India have the capability to make the (CAVCTS) equipment and the Indian program will go through without any U.S. help. The Canadians stopped their aid to our nuclear program in 1974. Though there were delays we pressed ahead with our reactor program. Now the Canadians would like to come back but we have no need for them.

It is not a coincidence the Americans have launched a simultaneous propaganda campaign about Indian sale of chemicals to West Asia which allegedly could be used to make chemical weapons. The chemical in question, thionyl chloride, is two steps away from any chemical weapon and is not in the list of precursor materials drawn up in Paris and in Geneva which are not to be sold. In fact the only process in which this chemical can be used to make a poison gas can be carried out more easily by the cheaper and commonly available hydrochloric acid. Thionyl chloride is used commonly for detergents, cosmetics, and many other innocuous substances.

The fact of the matter is the poison gas plant in Iraq was built with West German help. The U.S. controls are so sloppy that Israelis took away from that country hundreds of kilograms of weapon grade enriched uranium and Pakistanis Kryton switches. Pakistan got all its equipment for its uranium enrichment plant from Western Europe. Just now the U.S. is reported to be applying pressure on France not to sell the vibration climatic test machine to Brazil. Earlier the U.S. failed to stop the West Germans from transferring to Brazil technology on uranium enrichment.

What the Americans overlook is that there are thousands of scientists in the Western world who have worked in the chemical, nuclear and missile programs who can be hired at appropriate prices by rich Arab countries. They are helping Iraq, Egypt, and Argentina in CONDOR missile program. The U.S. threw out Dr Qian Xuesen in 1955 and he went to his native land and built the Chinese missiles. The British scientists disbanded from the Manhattan atomic bomb project fabricated the British bomb. The American approach to stopping other countries from having weapons they develop with brains borrowed from the rest of the world is the same as that of gods in the Greek fable who wanted to preventy mankind form having the secret of fire. But Prometheus stole the secret of fire for the benefit of mankind.

The American Administration and Congress are still to reconcile themselves to the inexorable fact that the U.S. is no longer the hegemonic power it was and it no longer controls the scope and extent of technology it did in the fifties. Western Europe and Japan are its competitors and a vast amount of technology is available outside the U.S. while the Western Europeans and the Japanese may go along with the U.S. in terms to paying lip-service to U.S. sponsored missile control regime the Western governments have no control over the movement of talented personnel or exports of subsystems. The man who designed the nuclear export control trigger list, Claude Zangger of Switzerland, himself authorized export of subsystems required for the uranium hexaflouride circulation system to Pakistan as that system was not in the trigger list since he did not think that a developing nation could set up a uranium enrichment plant.

India has proposed that both nuclear weapons and chemical weapons should be outlawed and eliminated and there should be a total nondiscriminatory verification regime for all nations.

This is the only way in which nuclear and chemical wapons can be eliminated and the world can be made safe from proliferation both the ongoing one by the industrialized nations and China and the impending proliferation by threshold countries. [sentence as published] But the U.S. and its supporters unrealistically hope to keep such weapons in their cartelized control and prevent the other nations, especially non-white developing nations, from having them. They have developed a strategy of "Discriminate Deterrence" by which they aim to use missiles of high accurancy with stand off

capabilities in developing world even while preaching non-proliferation of such weapons to those countries which are the intended victims of such punitive coercive diplomacy by the U.S. and other industrial countries. They oppose Gorbachev's plea for stopping missile modernization and insist that missile modernization is a necessity for their own security. At the same time they argue that other nations should not develop missiles. To recall the words of late Ambassador V.C. Trivedi during Geneva non-proliferation treaty negotiations in 1965 they want to disarm the unarmed.

Attempting to stop missile and chemical weapons proliferation even while the industrialized nations continued to proliferate them is a futile exercise. The NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] could not stop Israel, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa from developing adequate know-how to make the weapons. The missile non-proliferation regime does not stop Israel from developing Jericho II, China from selling CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia, Silkworm missiles to Iran and M-9 missiles to Syria. The joint Iraq-Egypt-Argentinian missile project is not going to stop, nor Pakistani missile projects. As the West increases economic pressures on China, they would sell more missiles to Arabs to earn foreign exchange.

The chemical weapons are very easy to make for any country which has a pesticide industry. Hundreds of European scientists are waiting to sell their services. Given this international situation which is beyond U.S. capacity to control it would do well to listen to the Indian advice and join in a cooperative international effort to ban and then eliminate chemical and nuclear weapons. If the U.S. continues to persist in its hegemonistic dreams then India will have to protect its own national security in the best possible way. So long as "discriminate deterrence" is pursued by U.S, China continues to have missiles and sell them, India cannot afford to give up its missile program.

Today the U.S. has no economic clout vis-a-vis India. If they think of reducing aid to India they should give thought to the possibility that India might be compelled to sell technology including various kinds of weapon technology. India has been exercising extraordinary restraint in regard to transfer of weapon technology. The U.S. Congress may now refuse to sell India combined acceleration and climatic vibration test machine. When India develops those machines in the next few years the U.S. will have no hold on India selling it to other countries. A noted U.S. strategist, who worked on President Reagan's White House staff, Geoffrey Kemp, recently warned his countrymen India was not Libya and it would be counterproductive to club them together. Some of the U.S. senators and congressmen with their parochialist fixations may not be aware that even in their own country the Indian community has contributed significantly to the U.S. scientific achievements. It should be made known to them that India has a reservoir of scientific and technical talent. The Indian missile program should be pressed ahead with full vigor without undue worry about U.S. pressure.

Prospects for Demilitarization of Europe

18011002z Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (First Edition) in Russian 19 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by Vladlen Kuznetsov: "A Warning for All Times"]

[Text] During the breakthrough phases of world development—and we are currently living through just such a phase—our thoughts turn more frequently to history than they do in average, so to say, ordinary times. They turn to history's experience, its lessons. They seek in history answers to the mind-boggling questions of modernity, support for decisions of principle.

The peoples of Europe, and not only of Europe, recently commemorated the 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. The tragic events and the lessons of the half-century's remoteness must not fade into oblivion, to blot out the memory of the generations. They are a warning for all times.

The wounds on the body of Europe have been healed for a long time now. But the scars remained, and they are as irremovable as is the memory of war itself, and its lessons, which should not be forgotten, even if almost a half-century of peace has reigned over its former ruins and ashes, the longest peace in the continent's history. It should not be forgotten because the complications, crises, and conflicts usually arise from the things to which we attach no particular importance at the moment, like a fire from a carelessly thrown match or cigarette butt, or an unextinguished campfire. Where there is military confrontation or contiguity of blocs, it is dangerous; any spark may prove fateful. As even Aristotle said, wars arise over trifles, but their reasons are never trivial.

In many ways, Europe's peaceful future is already ensured, by the recognition of the inviolability of borders and the existing status quo, by the incipient physical disarmament, the common-European process, and the general improvement of East-West relations. Many politicians and commentators associate the further fate of these relations with the processes of renewal in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. These changes, which require peaceful conditions for their realization, work toward stabilizing the situation in Europe, toward weakening military confrontation. Such is the objective content and intention of these transformations, and they are evaluated as such in those circles of the NATO countries which think realistically. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the venerable political scientist and former national security adviser to the U.S. President, has on more than one occasion in the past given cause for criticism of his biased approach to events in the socialist world. If I am not mistaken, he is now nearing the point of rising above his odious antipathies, declaring that the transformations in Eastern Europe have fundamentally important consequences for the stability of the relaxation of tensions between East and West. In the political scientist's opinion, in light of this, the NATO countries must "give a clear understanding that the West recognizes the necessity of Poland remaining in the Warsaw Pact."

However, not everyone is approaching such sober calculation. The temptation to play the Poland and Hungary cards is too great for those people for whom the world is "wedged" between the opposition of the "free world" and "godless communism," people who still think in categories of "rolling back" socialism. They are even trying to infect and attract official circles with their inept passion. On the pages of the WASHINGTON POST, R. Evans and R. Novak claim to be rousing the administration out of "deep slumber." In the authors' opinion, it "does not have enough foresighted strategic thinking in order to exploit the crack in the Soviet empire." The dense backseat drivers also found their way into the NEW YORK TIMES, where they are dissatisfied with the White House's "surprisingly restrained reaction" at a moment when "there appeared a real opportunity for the weakening of communist influence in Europe." These gentlemen emancipate themselves from the need to think about what might occur, and what the end might be if the two sides take it upon themselves to weaken one another, to seek out cracks in the systems of their alliances, and to drives wedges into these cracks. As a result, would not stability, security, and peace in Europe, the basic interests of both sides, suffer?

I do not think that U.S. national interests on the continent would consist of conducting a course for the stratification of the Warsaw Pact structures, setting certain countries off against others, nudging toward "decommunization" and a "break with the USSR." Such an approach will not strengthen the U.S. position in Europe, for there can be no strong support, no reliable system of peace on unhealthy, torn-up soil. U.S. interests would be best served if they did not deviate on the whole from the interests of the majority of European states which crave stability, provision of good neighborly relations, and emancipation from the pressure of military expenditures.

What, in general, do American interests in Europe consist of? Of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? But after all, the members themselves aspire to this as an ultimate goal, if, of course, NATO reciprocates. Of bringing the socialist countries closer to the West, of assimilating its values? But after all, the socialist states are involved in this themselves, renouncing their former reticence and trying to enrich their value system with everything which seems worthy in the different life style.

The majority of peoples is convinced that the very greatest value, the highest interest is the opportunity to work and compete in peaceful conditions, to exchange accomplishments for the common good. However, in Washington, up to the present day, they have seen their interests not so much in international trade, which COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] has fettered in a mass of discriminatory stipulations, but rather in a high degree of political and

military opposition on the continent. Today, a few people even call for an increase in that level.

True, in the White House recently there have been more frequent announcements of aspirations to "agree on a less militarized Europe," as President G. Bush himself put it. His proposals for reducing conventional forces and armaments in Europe appear to be more serious than, and preferable to previous American projects. However, there is still no basis for speaking of a radical revision by Washington of the scale and direction of its "military responsibilities" on the continent.

It is difficult to imagine a "less militarized Europe" without rejecting the doctrines of nuclear deterrence and "flexible response," geared toward "preemptive" use of nuclear weapons, without eliminating the European nuclear weapons remaining on the continent. Excluding its small tactical systems from the overall process of European disarmament, as the NATO leaders insist upon doing, would lead to a new takeoff for the arms race in the nineties. To this day, the NATO countries still consider it possible to conduct maneuvers "during the course of which they theoretically destroyed a major part of Central Europe with the use of tactical nuclear weapons," as the American television company ABC reported.

A "less militarized Europe" is not compatible with the preservation of the Pentagon's military bases; with Washington's reluctance to discuss the problem of reducing the naval forces which play a noticeable role in the European strategic balance; with the various plans intended to compensate for the elimination of the medium-range nuclear systems covered by the Soviet-American treaty, themselves assessed as a "loss" by the NATO leadership.

Because of the opposition of many of the North Atlantic partners, Washington had to postpone the program for improving the nuclear systems remaining in Europe. However, now and then reports crop up in the western part of the continent that a "quiet" modernization is taking place. This testifies to the fact that Washington is determined to avoid a "third zero" at any cost, fearing both for the fate of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and for the preservation of their obviously prolonged presence on the continent, which is no longer justified by any need. After all, across the ocean they fear that Western European society may demand that a "third zero" be followed by a "fourth," the withdrawal of the American "defenders," since the need for them declines as a result of the disappearance of the scarecrow of the "Soviet military threat."

Influential circles overseas still see American interests in Europe to be in the preservation of their emplacement and outpost in the Old World, as well as in the creation of such Western European military structures and organizations as would be under U.S. influence. These circles try to convince both themselves and others that U.S. interests are not served by active, multifaceted, and equal cooperation within the United States—Western Europe—Eastern Europe "triangle," but by a policy of differentiation, a "divide and conquer" policy with regard to the Warsaw Pact state, a policy of widely advertised, but essentially meager "dosed" assistance which they are prepared to administer only to prevent the regular concession.

It seems that it would be much more useful to convince themselves of something entirely different. Of caution, of the need for a balanced approach, or delicacy, if you will. All the more so because the position of the White House does not always seem to be that way. We cannot but be alarmed that Washington today is not tactful in its relations, say, with Panama, Nicaragua, Cuba, or several other states. It seems that the White House must still show that it is not acting on a "what you see is better than what you get" basis, nor paving the road to the "common European home" with intrigues; that it is not giving in to the Soviets, nor to the temptation to put an early end to world socialism and the "Soviet empire." A superpower, imperial course is unsuited for Central America, Europe, or any other region. A sincere and honest policy based upon firm convictions and principles cannot be bifurcated. It cannot be duplicitous, with a false bottom, or a rock ready behind the back.

It must be seen and accounted for that the "decommunization" of Eastern Europe would lead to disintegration, and that would lead to destabilization. There is no state in Europe or beyond its borders whose interests would be served by a destabilized continent, one which had to pay for this with war a half-century ago. Those who emphasize the United States-USSR rivalry in Europe are taking a heavy responsibility upon themselves. Only Moscow and Washington's consolidated role, only their partnership is capable of rendering Europe the service it needs most: the organization of a structure of peace which would spare Europe conflict once and for all.

Readers Respond to Arbatov Article on Restructuring Armed Forces

18120121 Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 8, Aug 89 pp 133-143

["Letters to the Editors": "On Aleksey Arbatov's Article 'How Much Defense Is Sufficient?'"]

[Text]

Not Avoiding What Is Not Commonplace

I read Alexei Arbatov's article "How Much Defence is Sufficient?" with great interest. To my mind, it is the most serious piece of writing on Soviet military policy in our press. The article is attractive above all for its boldness in raising, within the framework of a debate, a host of signal issues pertaining to the nation's defensive capacity.

Until recently it was normally believed that only career members of the Armed Forces could speak out on such matters, let alone the fact that they are the ones who shape military policy as such. Outwardly this looked logical: indeed, who if not professionals, in this case the men in uniform, know best the state of affairs in a specific sphere?

Regrettably, the uniform and even ranking-officer's stripes do not by themselves guarantee infallibility of the decisions taken in the strictest secrecy, without public involvement in such a vitally important endeavour. We, the "uninitiated", have not even been granted the right to know with what means, at what cost and how reliably our own security has been ensured. For 70 years the nation has given the army everything it could, even more. For decades we were brought up in the serene conviction that at least in the army everything is in order, that "our armour is strong and our tanks are fast". We believed in this contrary to common sense and a system approach. Meanwhile negative processes were developing in the army, albeit in a concealed form, that were similar to those taking place in society as a whole.

A sudden sobering effect came on the shameful day when an impudent West German lad landed his sports plane right on Red Square, having unimpededly crossed the Soviet border and penetrated the deeply echeloned air defence system. It was then that many people, both in the army and in society at large, gave matters serious thought.

The impenetrable wall of secrecy that surrounds the activity of our military department to this day is evoking growing concern on the part of public opinion that is awakening from its lengthy hibernation: Is the nation's security truly reliably secured? How much is being spent on defence, and is it being spent reasonably? Are there possibilities for greatly reducing armaments and armed forces without detriment to our defensive capacity? Do we need such a cumbersome and extremely expensive military machine, considering the crisis our economy is in? Lastly, does it make sense to switch from compulsory military service to, say, a professional army? How does the policy of extensive military exports to developing countries jell with the new political thinking? How is the officially proclaimed doctrine of adequate defence being pursued?

Regrettably, our military far from always provide convincing answers to such questions. One gets the feeling that the army is not used to frank talk, that its officials react painfully to society's critical concern for the state of affairs in the military sphere, unjustifiably regarding this as all but an attitude of antipathy to the nation's defenders. I am convinced that no one in this country has, nor can have, a negative attitude to the army, the flesh and blood of the Soviet people. The same can all the more be said of this author, who grew up in the family of a career officer and fighter at the front in the Second World War, and who spent 12 years with him in military garrisons and cities. All I am saying is that the army should be helped in surmounting its historically shaped introvertedness and in finding through concerted efforts the optimal ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the military policy while simultaneously strengthening the defensive potential.

This is what I view to be the point of Alexei Arbatov's article, which may not have suited everyone since it openly raises a host of thorny issues of Soviet military policy in the light of the changes apace not only in our society but in international relations as well.

I can anticipate the first objections: Can a non-military person discourse on such things as military doctrine and strategy and delve into special questions where the military still consider themselves alone to be competent?

Essentially, this posing of the issue can not only and not so much be a manifestation of narrow-professional haughtiness but also that of the painfully familiar departmental approach typical of our stagnation-ridden past, the bitter fruits of which we will be reaping for a long time to come. The example of the Ministry of Water Resources, which is accusing scientists and writers of incompetence, should caution all of us against professional snobbism. The uncontrolled arbitrariness of "professionals" has cost the country too dearly.

First of all, we are talking here about the author, a prominent expert in international security and disarmament who has published a large number of serious writings. Secondly, one can allude to the example of the West, where most military theorists from the most authoritative research centres are ordinary civilians, which does not prevent them from having a fine grasp of the specifics of military matters. Lastly, it has long been said in all seriousness that war is too important an undertaking to entrust to generals.

Incidentally, in all civilised countries the post of minister of defence is occupied by political figures, not professional military men, which in no way lessens the defensive capacity of the USA, France, Britain or any other member of the Western alliance. There are, of course, national traditions, and here we are, regrettably, closer to the Afro-Asian model. By the way, in the number of marshals (even excluding the marshals of services) we are solidly in first place worldwide, even in our peaceful times. This highest military rank, after all, was initially conferred for successful handling of strategic operations during the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, even though there were some curious exceptions (Marshal Beria). As early as the 1950s-1970s the title of marshal had, in my opinion, become morally devaluated, especially after it had been conferred upon Leonid Brezhnev. And now, 44 years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, when peaceful international relations are being established, conferment of the title of marshal merely for a post occupied looks like an unjustified anachronism.

Let us return, however, to the main theme of this article. Indeed, "how much defence is sufficient" and how much should it cost? I don't think that anyone could give

definitive answers to these questions today. But the answers should already be sought if only because this is required by the proclaimed doctrine of defence sufficiency, that is, if people do not want to reduce it to another propaganda ploy.

Arbatov's article is a constructive contribution to the search for answers to the issues raised by the times. One cannot but agree with him when he states that reasonable defence sufficiency cannot be reduced to a simple decrease in a certain number of troops and armaments. The point should be a sweeping overhaul of strategy, operational plans and armed forces, including by way of reduction, revision of modernisation programmes, and redeployment—above all with the aim of extensively buttressing the country's defensive capacity over the long term.

I am fully in agreement with the way the author poses the problem of secrecy in the national security sphere. There is necessary and justified secrecy, and there is invested secrecy—not from a rather well-informed enemy equipped with sophisticated means of space-based intelligence gathering, but in effect from one's own people. In just the same way as there is national security and departmental, corporative "security", which is vigilantly protected by an 18-million-strong bureaucratic host. The army unquestionably has specific needs, but it cannot have interests different from the interests of society, of the entire nation, serving which is its overriding duty.

Any Soviet military expert or journalist specialising in international affairs can freely receive a rather complete idea of the long-term military programmes being undertaken in the USA or, say, in France (one merely needs to know the appropriate foreign language), as these programmes and the outlays for them are published openly in the press and are discussed in parliaments. Only Soviet society does not know about its own defence programmes, and has just learnt about the resources spent on defence. Nevertheless, the figure of 77.3 billion roubles announced at the Congress of People's Deputies, in my opinion is far from complete, especially in comparison with the US military budget of about 300 billion dollars.

There is no point in rehashing all the proposals for rendering our defence policy more efficient while simultaneously buttressing our defensive capacity that were contained in the Arbatov article. I find them rather convincing. The main thing that the author is proposing is to concentrate efforts on the main, most advanced, areas of military development that would take account of our strong and vulnerable points, and not to continue senseless (and totally unjustified, even from the standpoint of national security interests) dispersion of the taxpayers' money for dubious and ineffective programmes. The accent in military policy and production should be placed on qualitative rather than quantitative parameters. If the notion of cost accounting is applicable to the defence sphere at all, this accounting, as Arbatov rightly pointed out, should be manifested in maximum returns that would ensure truly reliable, guaranteed security of the Soviet people.

Implementation of the proposals formulated by the author of the article could in his opinion theoretically reduce our arms expenditures by as much as 50 per cent in as early as the next five year-plan period, with the nation's defensive capacity being qualitatively bolstered. Certainly a very alluring prospect, especially in the context of our extremely acute economic problems. It would be worthwhile to explore it in a more qualified way, and at the same time discuss Arbatov's proposals, but this should be done not behind closed doors, as we are accustomed to doing, but in an open and constructive scientific debate. We should not avoid discussion of national security matters, which is so unusual for us. The more open and fruitful the discussion, the more correct the choice of the optimal variants of maintaining the defence capacity at the level of reasonable sufficiency and the more successfully we can resolve our neglected economic and social problems.

One last point. We are increasingly learning of instances where military units are used to restore law and order in different parts of the country. It is my conviction that the Soviet Army should not be utilised for these purposes, which is fraught with the gravest moral consequences. It is one thing when the military help the people in times of natural disasters, as this is a humane mission, and it is quite another when they perform policing functions that are in essence not endemic to them. We are not, after all, living in a banana republic. There is the sufficiently powerful arsenal of the Ministry of the Interior, which incorporates the Interior Troops, and which is specially trained to maintain public order. The army, however, should engage only in its work—reliably ensuring the external security of the USSR.

Pyotr Cherkasov, D. Sc. (Hist.), Senior Research Associate, Institute of General History, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow

There Aren't Any Problems

I think that with regard to so principled and topical an issue as how much defence is sufficient you have let a person incompetent in this sphere contribute to your journal. The author is searching for an answer on the sidelines. As a result, he is basing it on dogmas of US Sovietologists, referring to their sources and presenting all this "in the light of the new doctrine and strategy", thus injecting his viewpoint into the formation of our military course. Probably the author should have been helped if it was he who was to write on the problem in question. I believe that you will allow experts, too, to speak out on the pages of your journal on the adequate defence issue. We readers will be provided an opportunity to compare views.

The essence of my criticism of sorts against your lies not only and not so much in the afore-mentioned. The fact of the matter is that Alexei Arbatov adduces Mikhal Gorbachev's words to the effect that "there is no roof on

earth or in space under which one could take shelter from a nuclear thunderstorm should it break out". Further, he writes: "Surely statements by the head of our state and our Defence Council are a strategic guidance for all the military agencies concerned". How is this to be understood? As criticism with a hint at the military department's insubordination to the political leadership?

If this is combined with the author's statements to the effect that earlier "defence became largely exempt from control by society, whose interests it must serve" or "the problem lies above all else in the lack of glasnost and unclassified information on military matters", etc., then it is probably in this way that he should be understood.

What is more, he hints that the military department is concealing something from society. Where is all this coming from? From a lack of information? Hardly. Arbatov unquestionably knows that the Soviet Armed Forces have always been under the direct leadership of the CPSU and the government. He knows who heads the Defence Council and who commands the Soviet Armed Forces; he knows that political bodies function in them as bodies of the party, and that the Main Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy has the status of a department of the CPSU Central Committee. Lastly, he knows that from one year to the next thousands of Soviet citizens serve in the Soviet Armed Forces as representatives of society for whom there are no problems of a "lack of glasnost and unclassified information on military matters", just as there is no lack of it in our publications.

As a historian, Arbatov should also be aware of the fact that preservation of state secrets on defence matters is a necessary measure each country takes to enhance its defensive capacity. These are state measures, not departmental ones. So the questions arise: Why is the author acting in this way? Why is he attempting to oppose someone? What is his aim in doing so?

Please put these questions to him.

Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Fyodor Rybintsev, Moscow

Stating With a Soldier's Straightforwardness

After I finished the article I, a career military man, was intrigued by it that I decided to reread it. I began with the words of Mikhail Gorbachev: "The problem is so acute that we will also have to take a look at our defence spending. A preliminary study has shown that we can reduce it without lowering the level of our national security or defence potential."

The words are well known, but after a second reading they produced a different impression on me. The first proposal, whether General Secretary Gorbachev liked it or not, prompted the idea that had not a (non-military) problem been so (sic) acute no one would even have considered revising military expenditures. Everything would have proceed according to the Brezhnev scheme. To the question: How much are we spending on defence? Brezhnev himself would answer: "We are spending as much as we need to". At that time such a reply evoked wonderment at the leader's wisdom. And now, though much later, another question is being posed: "But how much is necessary?"

Gorbachev's second sentence enables us to look farther. If the level of defensive potential does not decline as a result of reductions in military spending, then it will even increase due to the transformations that will take place within the part of the Armed Forces that remains after the reductions.

I believe that it is high time to examine military-industrial and purely military matters at the Central Committee Plenary Meeting. The point at issue is not submitting state secrets of special importance for nationwide scrutiny but discussing the most vital problems which are not a secret to anyone.

I agree with Alexei Arbatov that the problem lies above all else in the lack—to put it mildly—of glasnost and openness in military matters. And the essence is not even that the defence expenditures figure is frightening. The official defence budget approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet previous convocation includes only expenditures for the upkeep of the personnel of the Armed Forces, materiel, military development, pensions and a number of others. Such weighty defence expenditures as financing research and development and also purchasing armaments and military hardware come under different articles of the USSR State Budget. For their part, with their greater share they finance research, testing and capital investments into production facilities and not arms purchases. The questions suggest themselves: Are we right when we say that the army consumes a lot of money? Isn't it high time to use a normal and more exact word combination—the military-industrial complex, in which the industrial part has a much bigger appetite?

Why does the USA have two or three types of intercontinental ballistic missiles and we have more? Probably when different design offices were being formed and assigned the same tasks, good aims were being pursued—ensuring competition in work. Later, however, each of them, drawing on the levers and methods known to them, managed, and are still managing to push their creations through. As a result, we have in the troops not one best system, but several systems which cannot be identical in their fighting capabilities. Furthermore, because of this military schools are forced to train specialist officers with a much greater number of different profiles. Many officer graduates are assigned to new systems that they have not studied. When most officers go through service they sometimes have to change them a number of times. This also makes for difficulties in upgrading combat expertise, difficulties which are not always overcome in due time because of new appointments.

After pushing through its system, a military-industrial firm is not satisfied with this. As experts know, it immediately compiles a plan for field changes, which it then carries out, and at a high price. These field changes are astonishingly simple, but fabulously expensive considering all the expenditures, among them, travelling expenses and allowances for fields testers.

The arms race is not profitable for the military, since it does not have a very good effect on their living conditions. At the present juncture they are such that fewer and fewer people want to enter military schools, and in some places there simply are not enough applicants. Commanders and political workers engage in recruiting candidates for these schools according to plans imposed from above. It is not hard to guess about the nature of this "recruitment"—just anyone is talked into entering, so long as the plan is fulfilled. Sometimes a soldier agrees to enter a school solely in order to diversify his not always pleasant service. Now imagine the graduate of a military institution of higher learning who got there by chance, and who, for that matter, studied things other than those he will be working with. Such situations are not rare in the army today.

It is not fortuitous that the forthcoming armed forces reduction is impelling many of the most capable and energetic officers, especially young ones who have a great deal to lose, to retire. True, what has thus far kept them from doing so has been their hope for serious governmental measures to improve living and working conditions for the military. And if such measures do not follow in the immediate future, we will be only talking about qualitative parameters of the personnel. The military do not count on additional expenditures by the country, but they see the reserves which can appear as a result of intradepartmental reforms that will ultimately lead to improvements in the armed forces.

To my mind, the overriding imperative is a revamping of the organisational structure of the services. It presupposes the elimination of intermediate, unnecessary and sometimes hampering echelons of management; a revision of the structure of units with the aim of precisely delimiting the functions of the fighting and auxiliary units, and abolition of posts at which people simply do not know what to engage in throughout the day!

It would be expedient to turn over to civilians posts not linked with running units and services. This applies above all to the teaching faculty and laboratory staff of military higher educational establishments in the general-education disciplines, medical and other service personnel.

Unit commanders should be given full financial independence and an incentive to save funds. His present position forces him to spend money left and right in order to justify allocations on all budget items. I do not have to go into details—commanders know what I am referring to.

Military hardware should be ordered from different enterprises, its fighting possibilities and price stipulated, and it should be purchased on a competitive basis. Major purchases should have sanction of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

It would be a good idea to introduce the principles of cost accounting in the army. This is a separate major issue, however.

Despite the fact that we are still unprepared for the transition to a professional army, it is high time to elaborate its concepts, since we will arrive at it sooner or later. We are frightened by the cash allowances paid out to the personnel of the US Armed Forces. But we do not have to pay soldiers as much as American soldiers are paid, or as much as people in other occupations are paid, until this becomes possible. Why then make such comparisons? And how long can one keep giving simplistic answers to enormously difficult questions? I propose that we engage in serious computations, without concealing them from a wide range of experts: How much will we actually spend in excess of what we have spent, and how much will we gain? We will gain in the political and moral situation, in combat expertise and combat capability. We will gain from reductions of expenditures which are now necessary but will become unnecessary. We will gain in the sense that professionals will not break so much very expensive hardware and other equipment, as today's soldiers are doing. We can continue for a long time, and this is necessary.

Alexei Arbatov raises chiefly matters pertaining to military doctrine and strategy. My considerations are of a different order and, evidently, do not apply directly to international affairs, but I believe that our armed forces and our nation are not indifferent to them.

Anatoly Yuryev, Lt. Col., Orenburg

A Forum of NATO and WTO!

US analysts are following the reasonable sufficiency/defensive doctrine debates among Soviet military and academic specialists with great interest. Part of the discussion has focused on the need for a more candid exchange of data and analyses between civilian and military institutions.[1] In the essay that follows here, I would like to extend the logic of this argument and suggest that bilateral analysis is also needed to support "new thinking" between the major alliances.

Questions about national security within the Soviet Union today are as important to citizens of the US as they are to citizens of Europe. If my reading of what has transpired to date is correct, there seem to be three levels of concern about military forces. We might think of these as an analytical *matryoshka*,[2] a nested set of interests.

The first level is the matter of defining the problem. Here, there seem to be three related issues: What is reasonable?, What is sufficient?, and What is defensive?. The second level is the need to recognise, if not reconcile,

the different "world views" or perspectives that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) bring to bear on these questions. The final level is the issue of what could be done, methodologically, about reconciliation when perspectives are different.

Political and military scientists in both alliances have studiously avoided the sufficiency question for years. Here President Gorbachev must be given credit for making all of us uncomfortable by raising the issue again.

The Western equivalent of the reasonable sufficiency argument is the question, "how much is enough?". The issue of "enough" is now further complicated by an apparent desire to define sufficiency in terms of defense, not offense. This suggests that what has been sufficient in the past is no longer reasonable and surely not defensive. Such judgements expose some unstated assumptions, i. e., both sides' military capabilities have developed to a point where respective forces might be irrational and overly offensive. While the Soviets seem to have framed these questions, there appears to be agreement in the West on the validity of the larger issues raised. If this were not true, the recent Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) agreement would have been impossible, and prospects for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) discussions would be bleak indeed.

Thus in general terms, NATO and the WTO seem to have solved the first part of the puzzle. Without pointing fingers of blame, the major coalitions have agreed on the nature of the problem, a large first step for future solutions. We have not agreed on the specifics of *sufficiency* nor the requirements for *defense*, yet we have agreed that existing forces are unreasonably offensive and not sufficiently defensive.

This conclusion is unavoidable in light of conceptual approaches outlined by alliance CFE negotiations in March 1989 in Vienna. Here each side recognised the need to maintain a balance at *lower levels*, reduce forces that constitute a potential for *surprise attack*, and eliminate capabilities for conducting large-scale *offensive operations*. Further, both sides have now agreed on some of the specific forces which constitute offensive threats. These are: *tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, strike aircraft, combat helicopters, and personnel.*

Thus, without too much acrimony, NATO and the WTO have established the general terms of the forthcoming debate. This is a significant achievement in itself. Now, as Alexei Arbatov reminds us, defining "the limit of defense sufficiency is the cardinal question of modern political and military science".[3] Arbatov's challenge, interestingly enough, is directed at military and civilian analysts. His charge points to an important analytical asymmetry between the major alliances. In the past, WTO military specialists have dominated arms control analysis, while civilians have controlled similar debates in NATO. Now we see civilians playing a larger role in the East and military analysts playing an expanded role in the West. This new analytical pluralism should provide, at a minimum, some new thinking and possibly pave the way for some reconciliation of perspectives.

Perspectives

It would be simplistic to suggest that there is only one perspective dominating each side. In fact, there are many views among the seven WTO states and the 16 NATO nations. Nonetheless, there is a tendency on both sides to ascribe a particular view to the major coalitions.

Indeed, there may be a real need for each side to reach *some* consensus on perspective. Otherwise, it might be impossible to negotiate as an alliance. This tension between individual and group beliefs is as old as civilization. Yet, if there is a need to reconcile perspectives, there is also a prior need to understand them. Further, I would suggest that there are as many contradictions within respective "world views" as there are points of agreements. If this is true, reality seems to be a flexible commodity.

NATO is often portrayed as a subjective alliance.[4] Just as frequently the WTO is characterised as an objective coalition.[5] These polarities are modern attempts to classify an otherwise complex world. Yet, there appears to be some truth in these broad characterizations, each derived from philosophical heritage. The varying views of democracy provide an illustration.

The Socialist tradition tends to define democracy in terms of objective obligations, while the Western tradition tends to define democracy in terms of subjective rights. Critics claim that the citizens of socialism are too controlled, while Western democracies are too permissive. (Humorists often suggest that being good is the goal in the East, while feeling good is the goal in the West.) Clearly, citizens in every country have both obligations and rights, the difference is one of emphasis. Yet, this emphasis has produced very different societies. In one, the perspective is from top to bottom, while in the other, the perspective is bottom to top. Each is a legitimate, yet very different, vision of democracy.

Members of both alliances also like to think of themselves as rational. Indeed, rationalism seems to produce large crops of absolutes in both camps. One set is borne of dialectics, the other is borne of dogma. Yet, each is an attempt to define the same reality. Arbatov puts his finger on the dilemma: "Can recognition of objective reality be made conditional on the other side's subjective opinion? After all, the law of gravity would not be called off if the US refused to recognize it."[6]

On this point, I disagree with Doctor Arbatov. The laws of science and the laws of man have always been subject to revision. All laws change with time; they are changed by improved understanding. Reality is not objective or subjective; it is both, and much more. Indeed, truth and reality are belief systems. What we believe is real, and these beliefs are infected by myths as often as they are

supported by facts. As long as there is more than one side to anything, reality is "conditional".

Arbatov's frustration with "subjective opinion" merely serves to remind us of the limits of reason and scientific method. In a perfect world, the ideal analyst assembles the correct facts, interprets them with proven methods, and then comes to reasonable judgement. Yet, even this is not enough! Who bridges the gap between analysis and acceptance? The barrier to acceptance is often a long-held bias that resists argument, reason, or emotion. Belief systems are as real as the laws of nature, and we need to understand both in order to build bridges to new consensus.

The current debate in the US over "rational deterrence" illustrates Arbatov's dilemma. American political scientists are concerned that our policy of deterrence might not be as rational as it could be. One school supports indeductive models that tend to capture biases and the other supports inductive experiments that would root them out.[6] How this debate will be resolved is far from certain, yet this much is sure. Both parties agree that national policies are vulnerable to *unreasonable* fears and beliefs. If this were not true, we would have few disagreements and little need for negotiations. (Political scientists are fond of studying the obvious).

The subjective characterizations of NATO and the objective characterizations of the WTO are riddled with internal contradictions. If we put too much faith in either, we are hard pressed to understand why NATO methods for calculating the *military balance* are objective (i. e., using sterile numerical ratios), and WTO methods for calculating the *correlation of forces* are often subjective (i. e., using qualitative factors). Indeed, Western analysts regularly assume that NATO forces are qualitatively superior to those of the WTO, yet at the same time NATO uses few standard tools to measure quality or factor it into calculations of combat potential. Conversely, the WTO, assumed to be qualitatively inferior, uses analyses which calibrate quality.[7]

The dissonance which characterises these methods suggest yet a final level in our *matryoshka* where opposing views and misperceptions might be reconciled.

In 1988, General Yazov offered that the Soviet were willing to "compare quantity and quality" of arms and doctrine through "bilateral analysis" of combat potentials.[8] More recently, Soviet academics have restated this requirement. "We must do it by joint effort," says Alexei Arbatov. Such proposals should not be dismissed too quickly. Inter-alliance forums for collaborative military analysis could get us to the heart, the core of perceptual differences.

Multilateral Analysis

To date, both alliances have demonstrated good faith in political, diplomatic, cultural, and economic forums. Yet, arms control requires collaboration on several levels: policy collaboration, negotiation collaboration, and *analytical collaboration.*

While perceptions spring from many roots (ideological, cultural, historical, etc.), military beliefs tend to be formalised by analysis, methods of assessment. There is a great need to understand comparative methods for calculating combat capability. The benefits of such exchanges are twofold. First, they would provide a primary source for illuminating what is, and is not, important in NATO and WTO calculations. Second, a better understanding of assessment methods could furnish an opportunity to identify the comparative values and weights assigned to critical factors.

An inter-alliance analytical forum might be composed of experts from civilian and military institutes within NATO and the WTO. Such a group would focus on comparative analytical processes in order to solve the objective and subjective differences that seem to plague arms control positions. Each side likes to believe that its position is derived from logic and reason, yet unilateral analyses continue to produce distinct visions of reality. The flaw of this approach seems obvious. Unilateral analysis does not provide adequate support for bilateral or multilateral negotiations.

There are two separate issues here. The first is the question of whether or not joint analysis would help to resolve long-standing data and methodological problems. The second issue is the question of whether or not qualitative factors (i. e., measures of effectiveness) should be used to determine the realitive military balance in support of arms control. Proceeding on the assumption that we must walk before we can run, the answer to the first question should be an unqualified "yes". Multilateral analysis might then provide answers for the second question.

Both alliances waste too much energy arguing over what belief is "correct," "objective," or "realistic". In fact, unilateral analysis produced too many realities. Each alliance, captives of parochial analysis, produces its own version of truth. The problem is not so much a question of what is *real* as it is a question of how *beliefs* about reality are different. Bridging the gap between beliefs, analyses, and acceptance is the final test of reasonableness. This can only be done by reconciling different analytical methods. With such a process, reality is negotiable.

G. Murphy Donovan, Lt. Col., USAF, Washington, D.C., 202-767-1103, 19 June 1989

Footnotes

1. Alexei Arbatov, "How Much Defense is Sufficient", *International Affairs,* April 1989, pp. 31-44.

2. A *matryoshka* is a traditional Russian toy, a nested set of wooden dolls, one inside the other, usually painted as peasant women.

3. Alexei Arbatov, "Reasonable Sufficiency: Where Does It End?", *New Times*, No. 12, April 25-1 May, 1989, p. 13.

4. Robert Levine, "NATO, the Subjective Alliance: The Debate Over the Future," Rand Corporation, R-3607-FF/CC/RC. April 1988.

5. Dmitry Pogorzhelsky, "Vienna: After and Before", (an interview with Victor Karpov, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister), *New Times*, No 7, Feb. 14-20, 1989, p. 7.

6. See *World Politics*, Vol. XLI, No. 2, Jan. 1989. This issue is devoted to the rational deterrence debate in the US.

7. Maj. Gen. Yu. Lebedev and A. Podberezkin, "On the Eve of the Second Round," *Izvestia*, 5 May 1989, Morning Edition, p 4.

8. General D. T. Yazov, "On the Military Balance of Forces and Nuclear Missile Parity," *Pravda*, 8 Feb. 1988, Second Edition, p. 5.

95-Percent Reduction in Soviet Nuclear Forces Proposed

18120122 Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 8, Aug 89 pp 3-13

[Article by Radomir Bogdanov and Andrey Kortunov: "On the Balance of Power"]

[Text] Nuclear weapons entered the world scene slightly less than five decades ago. The philosophy of using them, which has taken the form of strategic nuclear thinking, is just as old. Its founders were American civilian specialists, who in the mid-forties began working for the famous Rand Corporation. As for the Soviet school of strategic nuclear thinking, it lags visibly behind the American school. For a long time, no open discussion was allowed in our country on questions relating to possible "exchanges of nuclear strikes", strategic stability or, say, the principles of building up strategic forces. The fact that our nuclear arms race was virtually a response to challenges from the United States and that we traditionally kept our military strategy secret played a negative role in its turn.

However, recent years have seen the situation change. There is more information now about our strategic programmes, and debates on prospects for the development of the Soviet strategic doctrine and for a military reform have found their way into the press. Already we have a whole school of Soviet nuclear strategists who can discuss the problem with their Western colleagues on an equal footing. Some express the hope that it will not be long before we and the Americans work out a common concept of strategic stability equally acceptable to both sides and reliably safeguarding world security.

These trends may apparently be regarded with some reservations as expressive of new thinking. It is certainly necessary and very important to overcome bias towards Western military strategic thought, seek compromise, renounce the traditional notion of the allegedly inherent "aggressiveness" of the West and master the achievements of US and West European military science. But there is no denying that in thrusting deep into the Americas' "strategic culture", we may drift to mechanically duplicating some of their strategic concepts and doctrines with all their shortcomings and negative implications. On one occasion in the history of Soviet foreign policy, we tried to deal with the United States according to its rules of the game. We mean the Soviet-US talks in the seventies on limiting strategic offensive weapons. The outcome? The nuclear arms race, far from being stopped, went on in the costliest and most dangerous directions.

Could the emerging limited "convergence" of the Soviet and US strategic schools lead to our country renouncing its independence in evolving nuclear strategy? Would we not tie ourselves to the United States and doom nuclear disarmament to a snail's pace? And then, how would the world react to such a Soviet-American nuclear condominium, to the setting up of a sort of world general staff, with the two leading powers deciding on what benefited or did not benefit international military strategic stability?

We consider these questions highly important and relevant. They concern a fundamental choice of development lines for the armed forces for several decades ahead. It has to be a choice between "equalising" Soviet and US strategic forces (and hence putting strategic doctrines on an equal level in the name of a common concept of stability), or giving an asymmetric answer—both material and conceptual—firmly rejecting the American rules of the game. In the former case we would have a predictably long process of limiting nuclear armaments through Soviet-US talks and in the latter, unilateral measures of a revolutionary nature by the Soviet Union.

If the choice of our country is to be historically sound, we believe we must stop to think once again about the real role nuclear weapons have been playing and can play in our foreign policy and about how independent of the United States our military political decision-making actually is.

It has long become a banality to stress the exceptional role of the nuclear weapon in altering the relationship between war and politics. An essentially "absolute" weapon that may be said to have summed up trends in the millenniums-long evolution of means of warfare, it has confirmed a forecast first made at least as far back as Clausewitz's days. The forecast said that some day war was bound to stop obeying politics and serving as a

guarantee of national security and to become a means of committing collective suicide.

All this has been mentioned many times in scientific works and in statesmen's speeches. But it is probably a major paradox of our times that the decades-old nuclear era has had relatively little effect on statesmen's traditional notions of national security and ways of safeguarding it and brought about no revolutionary changes in the foreign and military policy strategy of countries possessing nuclear arms. True, mankind has managed to escape a new world war but many a time mankind was close to it and, consequently, to destruction. Nuclear technology and political relations have been developing on two different planes as it were, without interacting. Where such interaction did take place it was very superficial and produced no essential or lasting changes in international relations, as it "logically" should have.

Indeed, for a very long period of history, international security was based on a "balance of power", of the military potentials of opposing states or coalitions. Every time the potential of one side grew, the only thing the other side could do to reinforce its security was to build up its own potential so as to restore the military balance. The principle of "balance of power" implied a most careful analysis of the quantitative proportions of the potentials of the two sides, for the problems of personnel and the quantity of armaments could prove decisive (although account had also to be taken of combat experience, the standard of troop training, the morale of the population and other qualitative parameters).

The appearance and deployment of nuclear arms necessarily led to the adoption of a new concept on international security based on "containment" ("deterrence"). From then on, there was no particular need in seeking reliable security through matching the strength of the potential enemy—in view of the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons. All that was needed was to make it clear to him that should he start an armed conflict, he would inevitably lose much more than he could gain. After a certain capability for mutual annihilation has been achieved, quantitative analysis of the balance of power becomes pointless.

All the main principles of military strategy, too, must change in the nuclear age. Whereas the system of international relations based on a "balance of power" provided for the possibility of periodical "trials of strength" to adjust the balance, deterrence cannot be based on the permissibility of testing it in practice. Whereas parties involved in the "balance of power" system had to be in a position to carry on warfare for months or even years, the appearance of nuclear weapons made acquiring a capability for "response" the chief task. And whereas alliances, coalitions and satellite countries were vastly important in the prenuclear world, their role from the point of view of dependable nuclear deterrence is negligible.

The transition to a nuclear world took long, as postwar history has shown. The leading military powers of today—the Soviet Union and United States—still largely base their strategy on traditional postulates, giving priority to quantitative indicators of the alignment of forces, the preservation of strategic alliances and the achievement of a capability for protracted combat operations. This lagging behind the developments which are dictated by logic and common sense not only entails huge material expenditures but causes immense damage to international security by heightening the threat of world war. Only of late have there been signs of abandoning traditional notions of military power based on quantitative indices. The principle of "reasonable sufficiency" as the pivot of contemporary strategic thinking is bringing qualitative parameters to the fore. But their sphere of application is not quite clear yet. Specifically, it is unclear whether they cover strategic nuclear weapons.

Why is it, then, that development and deployment of nuclear weapons did not lead to the substitution of a strategy of "nuclear deterrence" for the "balance of power" strategy and then to a reasonable and mutually acceptable modification of the former? Why did the arms race, including its quantitative aspect, continue? Why didn't alliances, buffer states and other traditional means of guaranteeing security become a thing of the past? Why is it so hard to bring about even a small reduction in the absurdly colossal nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and United States?

The most obvious explanation would be that the special nature of nuclear weapons, their fundamental distinction from other weapons, did not dawn upon Soviet statesmen and military leaders immediately—far from it. Both during the Potsdam Conference and after the US bomb raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin made certain statements minimising the significance of the new weapon and trying to prove that it would not decide the outcome of war. And while he was seriously concerned about the Soviet nuclear lag, there is reason to believe that neither he nor his immediate entourage ever appreciated the revolutionising role of nuclear power.

The materials published in the late forties and early fifties and statements by political and military leaders suggest that Soviet military thought turned out to be unable at the time to respond adequately to the revolution under way in means of warfare. It still proceeded from the concept of classical war. As a result, the Soviet military doctrine failed to advance beyond the experience of World War II, which, moreover, was analysed very cautiously. No reasonably serious attempt was made to ascertain the causes of the military setbacks of 1941 and 1942, let alone fully reproduce the panorama of the war. Nor was the oppressive atmosphere of Stalin's last years conducive to working out new approaches.

As regards the United States, it was painfully slow in realising the nature of the new weapon. True, US military science was well ahead of its Soviet counterpart but this had no real effect on that country's political or military practice.

It is only fair to say that in the late forties and early fifties, when the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals were only just coming into existence while means of delivering nuclear weapons were most imperfect and unreliable, it was hard to see a situation fraught with "guaranteed mutual annihilation". Nor is it possible to establish the exact moment when the two powers found themselves in that situation. (Current research into the likely climatic, geological and medical effects of nuclear war is pushing that moment farther and farther back.) But it is apparently safe to say that during the Caribbean crisis (October 1962), a situation threatening "guaranteed mutual annihilation" not only existed but was recognised as such by the leaders of both powers.

Nevertheless, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States stopped at the levels which their nuclear potentials had reached by the time of the crisis—they continued building up and improving nuclear armaments. And what is more, Soviet and US military leaders went on claiming contrary to all logic that a nuclear war could be won and would result in defeating the enemy without destroying human civilisation.

The foregoing implies that the refusal of Soviet and American leaders to adopt new rules of the game prompted by the logic of the nuclear age cannot be attributed to their misinterpreting the nature of nuclear weapons or underrating the latter's devastating power. The reason must have been different—we would say that the two countries' leaders expected to use nuclear weapons for ends having no direct relation to safeguarding international security. Both countries must have considered these ends important enough to justify both the back-breaking economic burden of the nuclear arms race and the mounting threat of nuclear war due to the growth of their respective nuclear potentials. As there can be no race with an only entrant, the United States would have had far less reason to build up its arsenal had the Soviet Union restricted itself at the time to maintaining its stockpile at a level guaranteeing "minimum deterrence".

We must note to begin with that the level of a "minimum deterrence" strategy was exceeded because both powers expected to use nuclear weapons as a means of safeguarding their security and, furthermore, of increasing their global political influence. This understandably necessitated greatly diversified and numerous scenarios of the "nuclear threat".

Much has been written in our country about how and in what circumstances the United States tried to use its nuclear weapons as an instrument of "extended deterrence", that is, of political blackmail against and pressure on other countries. The US military political doctrine still envisages such a contingency, especially in Europe. But we, too, made attempts to the same end. There was the note which Nikita Khrushchev sent to Britain in the autumn of 1956 threatening that country with a Soviet nuclear strike should it persist in aggression against Egypt.

Another reason why the United States and Soviet Union exceeded the level of "minimum deterrence" was, in our view, the political significance which the nuclear arms race itself had acquired. According to a concept current in international relations by then, the quantitative indicators of armed forces, particularly their strategic component, symbolised the nation's might. Both the Soviet Union and the United States supported this purely politico-psychological concept, not only because it set them apart from other countries, exalting them to a "superpower" status, but because both countries had their own reasons for following that irrational logic.

The Soviet Union, which still lagged considerably behind the United States in the economic sphere and had many unsolved social problems, found it tactically convenient to reduce all the diverse forms of competition between the two systems to chiefly military strategic ones. Military strategic parity, conceived as approximate quantitative equality, became something of a substitute for socialism's social and economic achievements in the competition with capitalism. There developed a certain parity worship, and what had been a means of guaranteeing security became an end in itself.

For the United States, the nuclear arms race acquired a useful economic function. But then it began to show its own inertia, which was harder to overcome with every passing decade. The United States was very hopeful that the economic and technological burden of the race would break the Soviet Union's back sooner or later and that the country would fall apart, being "worn out economically". Besides, with US economic domination in the capitalist world showing a relative decline, the Americans came to regard nuclear power as a guarantee of their political leadership.

A third reason why the Soviet Union and United States went beyond "minimum deterrence" was, paradoxically enough, the mechanism of disarmament talks which existed until very recently. The main negative aspects of these talks are the Americans' effort to negotiate from a "position of strength" ensured by a continuous arms race and the principle of obligatory reciprocity underlying the talks. Taking advantage of this principle, the side having a stake in the arms race and continued tension can by simply blocking the talks make it impossible for the other side to cut its armaments unilaterally.

As a result, both sides find themselves unable to reduce their armaments even if this would meet their military or political interests. Such reduction might be mistaken for

a concession or a sign of weakness. By the same token, the principle of reciprocity makes one side respond to an arms build-up undertaken by the other side even if defence interests do not call for it. Indeed, failure to respond in this way would be seen as an indication of "weakness". In other words, the negotiating mechanism in use until recently tied Soviet and US military construction together, as it were, preventing either of the sides from breaking the rules of the game by taking bold steps to reduce armaments.

The existing allied relations are the fourth reason why no "minimum deterrence" strategy has been adopted. One paradox of the nuclear era is that while the value of alliances is declining and for "junior" partners the involvement in them becomes extremely dangerous, the "fee" nuclear powers "pay" for their alliances becomes ever more dear.

In the prenuclear age, alliances were seen as a means by which a country could build up its national power, thereby strengthening its security. The emergence of nuclear weapons has changed the attitude to military alliances. As matters now stand, a country allied with one or several nuclear countries is less certain of its security and can do less than before to decide its own fate. And while alliances still ensure contacts between member countries and make it more difficult for an aggressor to implement his plans, they have lost their one-time importance. This is because nuclear weapons are a factor tying allies together and uniting them while at the same time accentuating their differentiation and tending to disunite them.

The fifth reason why the Soviet Union and United States exceeded "minimum deterrence" is, now as in the past, the looseness of the definition of the level of "deterrence", or the proportions of the damage which makes it politically unacceptable for the potential enemy to start a war. For the Soviet Union, it means ascertaining what damage is unacceptable to the United States and what the latter could decide to sacrifice in order to try to defeat the Soviet Union. US strategists currently estimate that the destruction of over 20 million Americans, one third of the population of their country or even half of it would be unacceptable.

In regard to the United States, these estimates (even the most conservative of them) are enormously exaggerated, of course, with the possible aim of exerting psychological pressure on the Soviet Union, as if to say that the United States could afford to lose one third of its population and hence to risk a strike to disable the Soviet Union. Yet the United States found the loss of 50,000 men in its war of aggression in Vietnam unacceptable and had to get out.

Declassified documents testify that from the early fifties on, the US leadership, presuming (in accordance with the most pessimistic estimates) that Soviet bombers could carry several atom bombs all the way to the American territory, regarded a policy of triggering war as unacceptable.

It seems to us that today, when cold war structures are being dismantled and the incompatibility of a "balance of power" strategy with the realities of the nuclear age is more evident than ever, there are objective prerequisites for adopting a strategy of "minimum deterrence". Such a strategy presupposes a drastic unilateral cut in the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the preservation of a small number of warheads which could not be destroyed by a first-strike from the potential enemy and would inflict "unacceptable damage" upon him as a result of retaliation.

To provide "minimum deterrence", it is indeed enough to retain 500 nuclear warheads differing in yield and mounted on SS 25 mobile single-warhead land-based missiles and Delta 4 submarines, which carry a total of up to 64 warheads on 16 missiles. This is less than one-twentieth of the present number of nuclear warheads. The rest may, in our opinion, be scrapped without detriment to national security.

The elimination of 95 per cent of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear capability would be a most serious step requiring careful consideration. The most diverse arguments could be advanced against going over to "minimum deterrence". The very fact that this would be a radical solution is likely to generate internal resistance, for the issue is national security. Any mistake in this matter could bring on irreparable disaster.

Let us look into the reasons usually given by those who object to "minimum deterrence" strategy and insist on keeping the existing nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union.

Going over to "minimum deterrence" would sharply reduce the flexibility of Soviet military political strategy and limit the range of likely responses to US actions, thereby tempting the potential enemy to try various acts of provocation. Let us imagine, for instance, that the United States were to deliver a "selective strike" against the Soviet Union and its allies, using low-yield nuclear weapons. Would we have to choose between refraining from retaliation and hitting Washington, New York and Los Angeles with megaton warheads? The former response would merely encourage the aggressor to go on while the latter would precipitate an all-out nuclear war. Hadn't we better preserve the existing "nuclear infrastructure", which makes it possible to respond to every strike from the aggressor with a commensurate strike?

These arguments would seem convincing except that to preserve and improve the existing "nuclear infrastructure" is to actually increase the war menace. We may be said to agree tacitly that a nuclear war could be limited to a controlled exchange of counterforce strikes. The development of new and high precision ICBMs and MIRVs gives the other side additional cause to seek greater flexibility, accuracy and invulnerability for its weapons systems and for a more rational strategy geared to waging war.

But a "minimum deterrence" potential (500 warheads differing in yield) would be such as to make it possible to

use more than one retaliation scenario. In the event of a "selective strike" against the Soviet Union or its allies by means of several warheads (that is, a strike by way of blackmail rather than as an attempt to disarm the Soviet Union or inflict a decisive defeat upon it), the greater part of the "minimum deterrence" capability would be left intact. Thus the range of retaliation scenarios would be wide enough as to both targets and yields. The important thing is that retaliation would in all circumstances take the form of a countervalue strike and not a counterforce one, that is, would be aimed at civilian targets.

"Minimum deterrence" might guarantee security but only for the time being. Sustained effort by the United States in the area of ABM systems and anti-submarine weapons, increasingly accurate delivery vehicles and ever more effective civil defence would sooner or later endanger the means of "minimum deterrence" left to us and make it possible to limit damage from the few Soviet nuclear weapons systems that would have survived a US nuclear first-strike.

The scenario may be visualised as follows. Highly accurate American first-strike weapons plus the latest anti-submarine systems would knock out nine-tenths (let us proceed from the maximum) of the Soviet "minimum deterrence" potential. The Soviet Union would thus be left with only 50 of its 500 warheads. It would retaliate by using these 50 warheads. Another nine tenths of these would be neutralised by a highly efficient ABM system with space-based components. Only five warheads would hit home, and civil defence measures would make it possible to substantially reduce casualties among civilians. As a result, the Soviet Union would find itself disarmed and compelled to surrender.

We think this line of reasoning is untenable, too. First of all, it is based on the abstract supposition that the United States would be able to destroy or intercept 99 per cent of the nuclear warheads of the Soviet "minimum deterrence" potential. No serious American expert on ABM and anti-submarine defence and strategic vehicle targeting systems would venture such a forecast. Even if the Soviet side were to do nothing at all to make its potential more "viable" and if the United States were to use all its material and intellectual resources to develop ABM and anti-submarine systems, so high a degree of neutralisation of Soviet "minimum deterrence" nuclear systems is unthinkable in the foreseeable future.

Second, what would the remaining one per cent which reached US territory after all be made up of? Five nuclear warheads with a yield of, say, one megaton each? That would be sufficient to wipe out Bost-Wash, or one of the two largest agglomerations of the United States (the belt of industrial centres on the East Coast extending from Boston to Washington), or San-San (the urbanised part of the West Coast from San Diego to San Francisco). This means tens of millions of inhabitants who would die in the early hours after the attack, an economic collapse of American society, a breakdown of the political system, ecological damage that would make itself felt for many decades. Is there an aim that would justify such damage? Are there any foreign policy considerations outweighing this amount of loss? We believe the answer is no.

"Medium deterrence" strategy is based on the concept of the US political and military leadership's rationality. But that leadership might act irrationally, ideological stereotypes might prove stronger than the opinion of experts, and illusions might outweigh sober calculation, with group interests winning the upper hand over national interests. The United States might risk a nuclear conflict even if the risk were objectively too great. Remember the early years of the Reagan administration, when top political leaders of the country affirmed that a nuclear war could be won, that it could be limited, and so forth. Couldn't this happen again?

Of course, if the race for the White House were won by a nuclear maniac, an adventurer like Hitler, "minimum deterrence" would not be effective enough as a strategy. But then there is no defence at all against an irrational nuclear strategy. Nor would a "balance of power" strategy be effective.

But is it wise to allow for such doubtful contingencies? After all, even Ronald Reagan, possibly the most conservative and anti-Soviet US president of the post-war period, a man who made very dangerous statements, especially in 1981 and 1982, showed great restraint and prudence in pursuing his policy. His administration never did anything that could have led to a US-Soviet clash.

Besides, the political situation in the United States and the level of anti-Sovietism in social consciousness and the thinking of the political leadership are largely conditioned by the international activity and military construction of the Soviet Union. Our very first real steps towards applying the principles of "reasonable sufficiency" in military construction and implementing the ideas of new political thinking in our foreign policy led to a marked drop in anti-Sovietism in the United States and discouraged support for a further increase in military spending. Now imagine the powerful effect that a unilateral transition to a "minimum deterrence" strategy by the Soviet Union would have. There is not the slightest likelihood that in such a situation power in the United States could be taken over by militarist ultras willing to risk suicide in the hope of crushing communism.

Incidentally, we should take account of the political impact of the Soviet Union adopting a "minimum deterrence" strategy when we stop to think of the possibility of the United States acquiring a capability for a "disarming strike" some time in the future. We do not think anybody would want to finance "Star War" programmes, the development of anti-submarine weapons, and so on, were the Soviet Union to opt for "minimum

deterrence". SDI comes up even now against financial problems that are hard to solve. Every step towards "minimum deterrence" would be a blow to the positions of the US right.

By reducing our strategic potential to the proportions of "minimum deterrence", we would descend to a level comparable to that of the nuclear forces of China, France and Britain. Whereas these countries may be discounted in assessing the strategic nuclear balance (the Soviet Union and United States account for over nine tenths of the world nuclear potential), the potentials of third countries would become important in the event of the Soviet Union going over to "minimum deterrence". Thus the world strategic balance would become more complex and hence less stable. It would be not only the United States but other countries that we would have to reckon with as potential enemies, which means that it would be much more difficult to maintain the "credibility" of deterrence. Besides, a sharp cut in the Soviet strategic potential might encourage third nuclear countries to speed up their modernisation programmes since this would become more important from the practical point of view than it is now.

Of course, in terms of cold war logic, a bipolar structure is preferable to a multipolar one. But whether we like it or not, the bipolar structure is disintegrating. Seeing that the Soviet Union advocates pluralism in world politics and rejects the "superpower" status imposed upon it, there is no point in clinging to military bipolarity. As regards the "credibility" of deterrence, the strength needed to reliably deter the United States would be more than enough to deter France or Britain. A further circumstance to be borne in mind is that the Soviet Union's unilateral renunciation of its status of nuclear "superpower" and a transition to "minimum deterrence" would undoubtedly lead to increased public pressure on the French and British governments aimed at making them wind down their nuclear modernisation programmes, especially if the transition were accompanied by corresponding moves in regard to conventional armaments.

"Minimum deterrence", like any countervalue strategy, is immoral because it holds the civilian population of the potential enemy hostage. For all the shortcomings of counterforce strategy, it provides for strikes against military targets, command centres and the political leadership. It leaves at least some hope that the war would not be disastrous to millions, that the more important cities would be spared and that the war could be kept within certain limits. The increasing accuracy of delivery vehicles and the diminishing yield of nuclear warheads hold out hope that future operations could be restricted to "surgical" strikes and so would not result in destroying the whole of civilisation. The adoption of a "minimum deterrence" strategy would mean returning to the period of "nuclear barbarity" and desisting from attempts to make nuclear weapons more "civilised".

It seems to us that the two concepts are being mixed up on this point. If in speaking of the strategy of **preventing** nuclear war, we proceed from the assumption that such a war is perfectly possible and that we must therefore work out optimum scenarios for the conduct of military operations, a counterforce strategy really seems more humane than a countervalue one. However, even a superficial analysis suggests that as far as casualties among civilians are concerned, the difference would not be so very great. But if we consider that there must be no nuclear war at all and that the chief task is to prevent it, then it would be the height of immorality to try in any way to "civilise" nuclear arms, to prove that damage could be "limited", and so on. "Minimum deterrence" raises the "nuclear threshold" and makes the dividing line between war and peace perfectly clear, while a counterforce strategy virtually lowers the "nuclear threshold", giving rise to illusions about the permissibility of war.

Going over to "minimum deterrence" could provide new and greater opportunities for a global proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet and US nuclear arsenals are so enormous as to make attempts by further countries to join the "nuclear club" meaningless. Indeed, the political effect of coming into possession of nuclear arms (several units) of one's own is rather negligible against the background of the two "superpowers'" 50,000 nuclear warheads whereas the negative implications would be considerable (the likely hostility and mistrust of neighbours, a negative response from world opinion, a likely reduction in foreign aid, and so on). But if the Soviet Union were to cut its strategic potential to one twentieth, other countries may view differently the balance between the gains due to possessing nuclear weapons and its costs.

The comment this invites is, first of all, that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons binds the nuclear powers to seek a maximum reduction in their arsenals. Many countries which have the technology needed for the production of nuclear weapons and refuse to sign the treaty argue that the nuclear powers are still doing less than enough to meet their commitments. The adoption of a "minimum deterrence" strategy by the Soviet Union would demonstrate a responsible approach by one of the two leading nuclear powers and help strengthen the regime of non-proliferation.

The threat of proliferation would still be there, of course. It could only be removed through steadfast efforts by the world community. However, it is unlikely that this threat would grow sharply in the event of a reduction in the Soviet nuclear potential. After all, what is involved is not only the number of nuclear warheads (although 500 warheads amount to a quantitative level which no "threshold" country is equal to attaining in the foreseeable future) but the quality of delivery vehicles. In terms of qualitative indicators, the price of joining the "nuclear club" is going to remain very high.

A "minimum deterrence" strategy would make it impossible for the Soviet Union to defend its allies against an attack launched by means of nuclear or conventional arms, nor could we in such a contingency defend interests going beyond the prevention of nuclear war.

Now let us see what alliances and what interests are involved. In the context of confrontation between the WTO and NATO, any large-scale conflict between them would grow rapidly and almost inevitably into a global nuclear war. We have repeatedly declared that it would be impossible to limit a nuclear war to Europe. It follows that there is no need to preserve the material means of fighting such a war, including tactical nuclear weapons. In today's situation on our continent, East European countries have no need for Soviet "nuclear guarantees" since their security is inseparable from that of the Soviet Union.

In the matter of supporting Soviet interests in the developing world with nuclear weapons, an "extended deterrence" strategy based on nuclear weapons is an extremely hazardous business. There is no deterring the United States from undesirable activity without the concomitant and unacceptable danger of conflict and a loss utterly incommensurate with the importance of the interests being defended.

As for putting pressure on various forces in the Third World having no direct ties to potential nuclear adversaries of the Soviet Union, such attempts are mostly doomed to failure, as we know from history. Nuclear weapons were of little help to the Americans in Vietnam, the British in their conflict with Argentina and ourselves in Afghanistan.

The adoption of a "minimum deterrence" strategy and drastic unilateral cuts in Soviet nuclear forces would greatly complicate further Soviet-US talks on nuclear armaments. For us, it would mean renouncing the rules of the game formed over a long period. Reductions in Soviet nuclear forces would not be accompanied by the setting up of adequate verification mechanisms, and asymmetry between the Soviet and American potentials would grow. Unilateral moves by the Soviet Union would cause perplexity and nervousness in Washington even among those who stand in principle for arms cuts. The implication would be that we were refusing to use the opportunities offered us by talks.

All of it is true, of course. But let us stop and think which is more important to us: to continue talks or to achieve security at minimum cost to our economy. Talks should not be an end in itself. If the other side is unprepared for decisive breakthroughs at the talks (the Americans are not yet prepared to accept "minimum deterrence" and will hardly be prepared for it soon), unilateral moves appear to be completely justified. All important steps towards disarmament in the postwar period, with the possible exception of the IRM-SRM Treaty, were a result of unilateral decisions by the Soviet Union, the United States, China and other countries. Surely we are not doomed to be tied to the US war machine for all time and to be dependent on the political situation that happens to shape up on the Potomac.

"Minimum deterrence" would necessitate a shift of the emphasis in our military construction to conventional armaments and general-purpose armed forces. To make up for the reduction in nuclear forces, we would have to effect a corresponding increase in the capabilities of other components of our military power. Going over to "minimum deterrence" would be disadvantages above all economically, for instead of saving resources, we would have to shoulder additional expenditures.

This kind of logic might be acceptable if it were a question of preserving the traditional functions of the armed forces while altering the proportions of their various components. Yet the point at issue is a revision of the functions themselves, of renouncing "surpluses" of both nuclear and conventional armaments, which could be reduced simultaneously. China once set an instructive example by simultaneously freezing its nuclear programme and cutting its general-purpose armed forces by nearly one million men. This did not tell on its security. The principle of reasonable sufficiency applies in equal measure to all types of armed forces. Going over to "minimum deterrence" in the nuclear sphere should hasten the optimisation of our military construction as a whole.

A transition to "minimum deterrence" and a reduction of our nuclear forces to 500 warheads would be seen both at home and abroad as a sign of weakness, of our inability to bear up under the arms race imposed upon us. American hawks would attribute it to Washington's "position of strength" policy. And even if the reduction process itself proved to be relatively painless, it would still lead to a substantial decline in Soviet influence in the world and reduce our role in international affairs. Whereas the Soviet Union today is one of the two leading world "power centres", going over to "minimum deterrence" would make it just one of the great powers burdened, moreover, with many big internal problems.

How justified are these fears? If we are to go by the reaction of American hawks, we had better do nothing in this respect, for no matter what we did, they would interpret it in the most negative way, would represent it as a cunning tactic designed to lull the West or as a result of US pressure. As for the likely reaction of public opinion—both at home and abroad—we have gained experience we can draw on. We mean the reduction in Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men announced in December 1988. Numerous world opinion polls have shown that our unilateral measures are appreciated and meet universal support.

As to our status in world politics it is objectively bound to decline irrespective of whether or not we preserve a surplus of nuclear arms. This is because we fall short of a highly developed country on very many counts, including economic structure, living standards, life

expectancy and the environment. Our weakness will come out more and more as the cold war system disintegrates and international relations are demilitarised, with new, non-military components of national power coming to the fore. Of course, we could delay this inevitable process, but hadn't we better give up obsolete symbols of international status and concentrate on catching up with countries which have surpassed us in recent decades?

"Minimum deterrence" , like any deterrence, is contrary to the idea of a nuclear-free world. It means perpetuating nuclear weapons and condemning humanity to a permanent threat of universal destruction.

We suppose nobody would deny that from the point of view of international security, it would be better to scrap all nuclear weapons as soon as possible. But we cannot expect such a thing just yet. Our likely partners, at least now, are taking their time over subscribing to the programme for the abolition of nuclear arsenals by the year 2000 which our country has put forward. There is apparently a need for intermediate stages in the advance to a nuclear-free world, stages at which all parties to international relations could feel secure. "Minimum deterrence" could be such an intermediate stage for our country and, indeed, for the world community as a whole.

Thus the arguments against a "minimum deterrence" strategy turn out not to be very convincing when examined closely enough. Generally speaking, the idea of "minimum deterrence" and a twenty-fold reduction in Soviet strategic nuclear forces seems radical and almost Utopian only to those who stick to traditional political thinking and ideas of "balance of power". One has only to discard this approach, and all arguments in favour of a "balance", "parity" or an approximate quantitative and qualitative equality of Soviet and US strategic forces would fall apart like a house of cards.

What could progress towards "minimum deterrence" begin with? We see the best start in a unilateral 50 per cent reduction of strategic armaments, which we are negotiating with the United States. It is obvious even now that the Bush administration is going to stall, making further demands and revising agreements. Why should we again keep to the Americans' rules of the game? Hadn't we better give up this game, all the more so since certain provisions of the treaty on nuclear armaments now in sight would compel us to invest more in strategic area instead of spending less?

A unilateral 50 per cent cut in strategic armaments would represent something more than a big step towards optimising our military construction. It would have its effect on the United States by making it realise that there is no going back to the past, and would end all that is left of the cold war. The measure necessitates no extra talks or consultations—the political boldness repeatedly shown by the Soviet leadership in international affairs is sufficient for it to be carried out.

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Problems of Disarmament for Latin America

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[Article by S.V. Tagor: "Disarmament: An Approach to the Problem in Latin America"; editor notes that Cuba's position on this matter is not discussed in the article]

[Text] The Latin American countries have taken a definite position on nuclear and general disarmament. This position is clearly upheld in the United Nations, in the Movement for Nonalignment, and in the activities of the "Delhi Six." It reflects the common views of the Latin American countries on the nuclear disarmament of the great powers and the arms building of the NATO and Warsaw Pact military blocs. There is no such consensus, however, on the arms race and disarmament in the region. In this connection, we can discuss only the position of a particular or group of countries.

Reasons for Arms Race

The arms buildup in Latin America occurred because the atmosphere of intergovernmental relations in the region was frequently permeated with hostility and suspicion. Several territorial and ideological conflicts contributed to the estrangement of the Latin American peoples.

Most of the Latin American countries also built up their military potential for the following reasons: 1) national rivalry, power politics, and expansionist government policies; 2) external threats caused by the aggressive policies of states outside the region; 3) conflicts between socioeconomic systems and ideological enmity; 4) internal destabilization caused by the actions of antigovernment forces; 5) threats to the personal safety of national leaders; 6) the interests of industry, the government bureaucracy, and the technocracy.

It is a significant point that domestic policy considerations outweigh foreign policy concerns in the military-strategic doctrines of Latin American countries. The doctrine of "national security" influenced the development of the military complex greatly and then promoted the growth of the production of more weapons for counterinsurgency operations than for foreign wars. The same can be said of the doctrine of "ideological boundaries."

Eight of the twelve South American states made up the pairs involved in territorial disputes, and two were experiencing internal conflicts (Ecuador-Peru, Peru-Chile, Venezuela-Colombia, Venezuela-Guyana, Bolivia-Chile, and Bolivia-Paraguay; Peru and Colombia). Six of the eight Central American states made up

the pairs engaged in hostilities with one another (Nicaragua-Costa Rica, Nicaragua-Honduras, Nicaragua-Guatemala, Guatemala-Belize, and Nicaragua-El Salvador), and three were experiencing internal conflicts (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua). The political leaders of most of the young Caribbean countries were worried about their personal safety.

Any intensification of military activity in Latin America immediately caused a chain reaction, spreading from one pair to another. This was also the case in Central America, where Nicaragua built up its military potential because of the military preparations of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Belize used the threats posed by Guatemala as the pretext to invite English troops, and El Salvador and Honduras accused Nicaragua of escalating the arms race in the subregion.

An important cause of the arms race in Latin America was the emergence of local "military power centers": Brazil, Argentina, and Cuba. Some countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, began competing with other developing states for arms markets in the "Third World."

Regional Disarmament and Security

The first proposals aimed at the guarantee of regional security through arms reduction began to be made in the region in the middle of the 1970's. Back in 1974, for example, the Government of Peru requested neighboring countries to suspend purchases of weapons abroad for 10 years and use the savings for economic development needs. This request was mainly addressed to Chile and Ecuador. Territorial disputes with these countries were causing tension in Peru's relations with them. Only the leaders of Venezuela, Mexico, and Panama, however, responded to the Peruvian Government's proposal.

In December 1974, representatives of eight Latin American republics (Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador) signed the Ayacucho Declaration, which was based on Peru's proposal and was actually the first agreement in Latin America on arms race restraints. In the declaration, these countries pledged to limit their arms purchases abroad. The declaration never went into effect, however, and mainly because the atmosphere of trust required for the realization of such initiatives did not exist in the region.

The first regional initiatives were of a fragmentary and sporadic nature. The Latin American countries could not agree on the start of talks on the restriction of the arms race, which was escalating in the absence of any kind of regional monitoring and regulating institution.

In the second half of the 1970's the Latin American states continued to strive for the conclusion of a regional agreement to curb the arms race and to institute specific measures for this purpose. In 1980, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Panama adopted a "code of behavior" based on the principles of the Ayacucho Declaration.

In spite of the active position these countries took on regional disarmament issues, it was largely of a declarative nature and was isolated from real action on the regional level.

The concept of "reasonable sufficiency" gradually began winning more and more support in Latin America in the middle of the 1980's. In accordance with this concept, the countries in the region already have the military potential they need to secure their defense, and any further buildup would lead to instability in relations between neighboring countries and in the region as a whole.

When the Uruguayan minister of the interior addressed the Third Special UN Session on Disarmament, which was held from 31 May to 25 June 1988 in New York, he said that the "Third World" countries were spending more than 130 billion dollars a year on military needs and that this was several times the amount of the financial assistance these countries receive in the form of development loans from the World Bank. For this reason, he advocated steps toward regional disarmament.

President Alan Garcia of Peru became one of the chief advocates of the concept of reasonable sufficiency. In July 1985 he issued an appeal to the governments of all Latin American republics to propose the conclusion of a regional agreement limiting arms purchases. The Peruvian president also proposed the establishment of an atmosphere of trust between the military leaders of Peru, Ecuador, and Chile to reduce the tension in their relations.

The basis of the Peruvian approach to the matter was the idea of creating a system of regional cooperation and collective security to serve as an alternative to the use of military force as an instrument of international policy. The Peruvian Government reinforced its peace initiatives by approving the establishment of a UN Center for Peace, Disarmament, and Development in Latin America, and the center was opened in Lima in 1987.

In the opinion of the Peruvian Government, these actions were supposed to promote the creation of an atmosphere of trust in the region, without which any practical cooperation by Latin American countries in the disarmament sphere would be impossible. This has been discussed by various Latin American political leaders. The representative from Belize at the Third Special UN Session on Disarmament, for example, said that the creation of an atmosphere of trust between countries in the region is more important than disarmament itself. The first results have already been achieved in this area. They were specifically discussed by J. Sarney at the special UN session of disarmament. The president cited the Argentine-Brazilian agreement on nuclear cooperation as an example, saying that it had dispelled the rumors about a possible nuclear arms race in Latin America. He declared: "To underscore the significance of these decisions, the president of Argentina invited me

and Brazilian scientists to tour secret uranium concentration and nuclear research facilities in Pecanha. I responded by inviting Raul Alfonsin to the opening of the Aramar Center in Ypero, where new uranium concentration and reactor development facilities are located. In Pecanha and Ypero, we showed our people, Latin America, and the entire world our confidence and our determination to work together for development, using nuclear resources for peaceful purposes."[1]

Disarming the 'Unarmed'

The idea that the reduction of conventional arms should first be accomplished by the great powers has not been completely overcome in Latin America. According to this approach, it is still impermissible to "disarm the unarmed" and restrict the interests of "insufficiently armed" developing countries. It is still common opinion in the region that the Latin American countries should begin working toward regional disarmament only after the great powers begin nuclear disarmament and after military blocs and developed states take real steps to reduce conventional arms.[2]

The second session of the South American Committee for the Defense of Peace was held in Montevideo from 8 to 10 June 1988. A document entitled "Principles of Democratic Regional Security" ("Principios de la Seguridad Democratica Regional") was adopted at the session and included all of the ideas recently expressed in the region on peace and security issues. The ideas presupposing the subordination of countries in the region to U.S. security interests, the view of neighboring countries as potential enemies, and the performance of the functions of regulating internal social processes by the armed forces are described as unacceptable concepts in the introductory portion of the document. This section also says that the doctrine of "national security" and, in particular, the idea of "ideological boundaries" are incompatible with the process of democratization in the region.

The document explains how countries in the region interpret the terms "security" and "defense." The first term covers economic, social, political, military, cultural, judicial, and ecological security, because threats to the security of these countries can include any of these aspects. The term defense, on the other hand, presupposes political and other measures to secure the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereign rights of any country against outside pressure or threats of force.

The document says that the main prerequisites for democratic regional security are the political—and not military—resolution of social conflicts, a move from conflicts to cooperation between American countries, and the indivisibility of security on the international level.

The danger of the "spread" of the Central American conflict forced Latin American countries to take more active steps toward a regional security system.

When the Contadora support group came into being and the number of Latin American countries directly engaged in the search for peaceful solutions to the conflict in the subregion rose to eight, they began to form a regional political institution accepting security commitments as one of its responsibilities. When Peruvian Foreign Minister Allan Wagner addressed the 42d session of the UN General Assembly, for example, he said that the "eight" were a "new symbol of democratic political unity and flexible policy. They are arranging for a coordination process in Latin America to unify the region and enhance its significance in world affairs. This will entail efforts to create a new political organization, develop economic strength, and change ideas about collective security."[3]

The Third Special UN Session on Disarmament was an important milestone in the regional approach to security issues in the next few years. In his statement at the session, Peruvian Foreign Minister Gonzales Posada discussed the growth of arms expenditures in Latin America. He said that "Latin America has tripled its military expenditures since 1978 and has thereby accumulated pseudoassistance which is absolutely worthless at a time when we should have been dealing with the real enemies of the security of our people: poverty, hunger, the vulnerability of democratic institutions, terrorism, the drug trade, and irregularities in relations with world centers."[4] He spoke of his country's intention to link payments on the foreign debt with the enhancement of public well-being, to begin reducing expenditures on military purchases, and to spend as much money as possible on development.

The suggestion that steps toward disarmament be linked with the struggle for the establishment of a new international economic order is being voiced more and more insistently in the region.

Disarmament for Development

Back in 1963 Brazil was already asking the states with the greatest military strength to consider the possibility of allocating 25 percent of the savings resulting from disarmament for economic development programs in developing countries and was suggesting that the UN states could allocate 1 percent of their military budgets for the creation of an international economic development fund for Third World countries. In 1964 Brazil submitted a proposal to the United Nations, suggesting the reduction of the military budgets of all states and the use of 20 percent of the savings for the creation of an assistance fund for developing states.[5] In 1978 and then again in 1984, Mexico proposed the opening of a temporary special account for development needs within the framework of the UN Development Program as a temporary measure, prior to the creation of a disarmament fund.

The degree of involvement by the countries of the region in the arms race varied because of differences in their ruling regimes, differences in their levels of economic

development, and the consequent differences in their economic interests. In the most highly developed states of the region (Brazil, Argentina, and Chile), for example, it was the common assumption that the development of the local military industry would augment the economic strength of these countries. They regarded the production of conventional arms for export as one way of emerging from the economic crisis they blamed on their insufficient development and, in particular, on their limited export potential and their balance of payments in foreign trade. They saw arms exports as a tangible source of new foreign currency. To a considerable extent, this deprived these states of the moral right to protest the escalation of the arms race and to demand steps toward disarmament from developed countries.[6]

In the most highly developed Latin American states there are still many supporters of the theory that military research and development projects have a positive indirect effect on civilian branches of industry. They assert that the development of the military industry in the region is necessary not only because it strengthens the security of countries in the region but also because military research can be used in civilian branches. In their opinion, military branches represent a broad field for the "testing" of the latest technology.

It is significant that the supporters of this theory can influence their government's position on armament and disarmament issues. It is becoming increasingly difficult, however, for these people to defend their position. The idea that disarmament and development are interrelated has become popular and has won international recognition. Its supporters speak openly about the negative economic and social effects of the arms race in the countries of the region. In many Latin American states (particularly the least developed), there is an urgent need to make the colossal resources spent on armaments available for economic and social development needs.

This problem is attracting more and more attention in connection with the growing awareness of the economic need for disarmament and the realization of the damage inflicted on the prospects for national and regional economic development by the expenditure of resources on military production. Such countries as Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, and Bolivia have affirmed their willingness to sign a multilateral agreement on the limitation of conventional arms in the region on the basis of the general principles recorded in the Ayacucho Declaration.

In the second half of the 1970's the Latin American countries were already displaying a tendency to avoid taking concrete steps toward regional disarmament and to insist that additional assistance for their economic development could be financed by the disarmament of developed states, which, in their opinion, should start working on this instead of demanding disarmament from the "insufficiently armed" developing world. There is no question that the Latin American countries are aware of the connection between disarmament and development, but they believe that the first part of this formula—i.e., disarmament—applies only to developed states, while the second—i.e., development—is a vital issue in the developing countries.

In the 1980's the Latin American countries drew a distinction between political problems and the economic aspects of disarmament. This happened because they assumed that developed and developing states would have different interests and pursue different goals in the implementation of a policy of disarmament. These differences, in their opinion, were similar to the different goals the two groups of countries were pursuing in their ideas of international economic cooperation and the new international economic order.

Appeals to link action in the sphere of disarmament with the struggle for a new international economic order can be heard in the statements by Latin American delegates at international forums. In their opinion, the unfair relations between North and South, which are a result of the existing system of international economic relations, have been the source of international tension and have undermined international security.

The contradictions in the policy of Latin American countries on disarmament were also apparent in the 1980's when their representatives loudly defended the "hard and fast" theoretical precepts regarding the inescapable lack of correspondence between the interests of the North and the South and their inevitable confrontation, while they were also joining the search for negotiated solutions to difficult global problems because they knew that the latter could only be solved through concerted effort. This was reflected quite clearly in the collapse of the theories of "self-reliance" and "horizontal cooperation." People in Latin America grew increasingly aware of their relationship of interdependence with the developed states. This led to the gradual revision of the traditional approach of states in the region to developed countries. At a UN General Assembly session in 1981, for example, the Peruvian delegate said: "There is a growing awareness in the region that our demands on developed countries should not reflect any kind of hostility or imply confrontation.... The energetic promotion of peaceful coexistence is the important job the Third World is doing."[7]

It is obvious that discussions of the connection between disarmament and development are influenced by the approach of the developing countries, which see disarmament issues in the context of conflicts between East and West, and development issues in the context of contradictions between North and South. This is the reason for the developing countries' unique interpretation of threats to their national security and for the priority they assign to development issues.

Latin American representatives at the Third Special UN Session on Disarmament reaffirmed the importance of the interrelated issues of disarmament and development and suggested that "the great powers agree to include a

statement on cooperation for development in all future agreements on disarmament and arms limitation, and allocate a specific percentage of the resulting savings in military expenditures for the creation of a fund to combat poverty and hunger."[8] Attention is being directed to this aspect more frequently in connection with the global recognition of the economic need for disarmament and realization of the damages inflicted on national and regional economic development by the expenditure of funds and resources on military production.

Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

In the 1980's the Latin American countries began making increasingly loud statements of concern about regional and national security in the event of an international conflict involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. It became more and more obvious that there could be no such thing as a limited or local nuclear conflict.

There is also a growing awareness in Latin America that the doctrine of nuclear "deterrence," which paved the way for the first use of nuclear weapons and justified it, has now increased this danger considerably. The Latin American countries do not agree with some developed capitalist powers on this matter. An analytical document prepared in 1986 by experts from nonaligned countries (Argentina, Egypt, and India) and submitted to the UN secretary general, for example, said that it was wrong and dangerous to allege that the doctrine of nuclear "deterrence" was having a positive effect on world peace. It also stressed that the developing countries have to live in an atmosphere of intimidation, which has become an element of the official foreign policy of several nuclear powers.

In summation, the experts stressed the need to give up the doctrine of nuclear "deterrence" because of its "immoral essence" and its negative effects on the developing countries and the international community as a whole.

Representatives of Venezuela, Peru, Mexico, Argentina, and Uruguay expressed agreement with this document at the 41st session of the UN General Assembly. At the Third Special UN Session on Disarmament, J. Sarney pointedly criticized the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, saying that the balance of terror was a form of aggression against humanity.

The Latin American countries were and are active supporters of the comprehensive agreement on a nuclear test ban. They applauded the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests and requested the United States and other nuclear powers to join it. At the 41st session of the UN General Assembly, for example, the representative from Guyana said: "The moratorium on nuclear tests which was announced and repeatedly renewed by the Soviet Union, is a positive example of its willingness to reduce the danger of nuclear war."[9]

When disarmament issues were discussed at the 42d session of the UN General Assembly, the representatives from Peru, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Colombia issued another appeal for the complete cessation of nuclear tests.

In the 1980's the elaboration of comprehensive agreements to prohibit the use of space for military purposes and the extension of the arms race to outer space has been a pertinent part of disarmament. Representatives of Latin American countries were the coauthors of several resolutions appealing for international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space. At the 41st session Venezuelan Foreign Minister Simon Alberto Consalvi said: "We will oppose any attempts to militarize outer space, which some people try to portray as a panacea and the main way of eliminating the nuclear threat, although it is actually only a new attempt to evade the political and ethical problems of our day with the aid of more advanced, complex, unrealistic, and expensive technological formulas."[10]

At the Third Special UN Session, representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and other countries again advocated the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to outer space.

The signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) by the Soviet Union and the United States was commended by Latin American countries. The Peruvian representative on the First Committee, for example, said that "the INF Treaty between the United States and the USSR is of exceptional importance. It will pave the way for more significant agreements."[11] At the 42d session of the UN General Assembly, support for this treaty was expressed by ex-President J. Lusinchi of Venezuela and by the prime ministers of Barbados and of Trinidad and Tobago. Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo said: "This is the first time since nuclear weapons were invented that such an effective agreement has been concluded in the sphere of nuclear disarmament."[12] Obviously, the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security will only be possible in an atmosphere of continued Soviet-American dialogue.

At the 41st session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union put forth a new and important initiative, asking members to consider the creation of this kind of system. The system of common security proposed by the USSR was based on the integral program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century, set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986. Most of the Latin American states expressed resolute support for this peace initiative, saying that it was clearly the product of the great power's new political thinking. Ten countries in the region (mainly Caribbean states),[13] however, abstained from the vote on the draft resolution, and the delegates from El Salvador and Dominica were not present when the vote was taken. The main argument of the representatives of the abstaining countries was the allegedly vague wording of the resolution.

When the draft resolution on the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security was discussed at the 42d session, the leading Latin American states again expressed their approval of it. Representatives of 15 countries in the region, however, said that the wording of the resolution was still too vague and abstained from the vote. The representatives from Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti voted against the document because some of the points in the resolution would supposedly necessitate the revision or reform of the UN Charter.

Although several Latin American countries abstained from the vote or voted against the resolution on the comprehensive system of international security, they contributed to the creation of the system by supporting a nonconfrontational political dialogue on the matter and expressing their willingness to continue it.

Latin American representatives at the 42d session mentioned M.S. Gorbachev's article of 17 September 1987, "The Reality and Guarantee of a Safe World," in which he outlined the ways of achieving a safe world. The representative of Uruguay on the First Committee, for example, noted the tremendous significance of the specific proposals made in this article. In his opinion, it was distinguished by the unity of ideas and their implementation, thoughts and their realization, the unity of words and action.[14]

M.S. Gorbachev's speech in the United Nations on 7 December 1988 had great repercussions in the Latin American countries. Without underestimating the importance of the proposals regarding the reduction of Soviet arms in Europe for the cause of peace and security, we must say that the countries in the region had a stronger reaction to the initiatives concerning solutions to the foreign debt problem. For example, President J. Sarney assistant for international affairs, Luis Felipe Seixas Correa, even called M.S. Gorbachev's proposal of a 100-year moratorium on the repayment of the foreign debt, or the cancellation of the debt altogether, a direct result of the Brazilian president's visit to the USSR and "an important victory for Brazilian foreign policy."

The faction representing the Popular Socialist Party of Mexico submitted a draft resolution to the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress, calling upon the parliaments of all countries to take steps to secure the implementation of the proposals M.S. Gorbachev had made in the United Nations. The draft said that this applied above all to the proposals concerning the resolution of foreign debt problems, the transfer of the funds spent on the arms race to the resolution of social and ecological problems, and the intensification of talks on the elimination of strategic nuclear arms.

In Favor of Multilateral Disarmament Talks

Although the Latin American countries acknowledged the great significance of the dialogue between the great powers, they nevertheless expressed a preference for multilateral disarmament talks. The degree of commitment to the multilateral process can be judged by the active participation of Argentina and Mexico in the activities of the "Delhi Six." In his speech at the Third Special UN Session on Disarmament, President R. Alfonsin said that Argentina was participating in the activities of the "Delhi Six" in the hope of ending the deadlock in bilateral talks between the great powers on the complete cessation of nuclear tests by proposing multilateral talks.

The multilateral activity of the "Delhi Six" was most effective as long as there was tension in relations between the USSR and the United States. The peace initiatives of the "six" were addressed to the great powers but applied to the spheres of disarmament in which the talks between the great powers had reached an impasse during the period of stagnation in international relations.

Last year, however, the countries of the "Delhi Six" were less active precisely as a result of the development of Soviet-American political dialogue. Today it would be difficult for them to "reclaim the initiative" from the great powers, and there is no need for this. The countries of the "six," have not, however, given up the efforts to reach an understanding in the spheres of nuclear disarmament in which the dialogue between the great powers has not been productive. Their experience in finding compromises for the resolution of differences could be useful in this area.

Some of the failures in the bilateral talks between the great powers and the ineffectiveness of the UN resolutions on the cessation of nuclear tests have forced the countries of the "Delhi Six" to seek new fields of international cooperation for the elaboration of a nuclear test ban treaty.

Speeches by Latin American representatives at the Third Special UN Session provided the most complete theoretical substantiation of the multilateral process. In his speech, J. Sarney criticized the USSR and the United States for underestimating the contribution of the medium-sized nonnuclear countries to the cause of disarmament and proposed that bilateral talks be supplemented with multilateral talks, saying that "the weakening of the spirit of multilateral cooperation will hurt the cause of peace. However massive the arsenals of the great powers might be, disarmament cannot be a topic of discussion by only two superpowers. The matter is too important to be decided by two people, although they do bear the greatest responsibility for this."[15]

In reference to the contribution of nonnuclear powers to the cause of disarmament, the president of Brazil said: "The medium-sized countries have an important role to play in our day. I am certain that the decisive disarmament efforts that are being made by such countries as Brazil, combined with their determination to reduce inequality and asymmetry in the international system, are among the most important factors in the establishment of stronger international relations."[16]

The president of Mexico commented on the indisputable importance of the bilateral talks on nuclear disarmament between the USSR and the United States for the cause of peace and advocated multilateral talks in this sphere. He said, for example: "We feel optimistic about the recent convergence of the states producing nuclear weapons, but we cannot and should not give up our own rights or responsibilities. We must continue insisting on the decisive significance of multilateral talks. This is necessary..., so that no state will remain uncommitted to a matter of such great importance."[17]

The Colombian foreign minister also advised the development of multilateral talks on disarmament, saying that mankind cannot secure a lasting peace on earth as long as the decisions on disarmament are made by only two great powers.

Some representatives of Latin American countries, however, complained about the lack of results in multilateral talks and provided their own explanations for this. The president of Argentina, for example, criticized the results of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, which, in his words, had not made much progress in stopping the nuclear arms race, preventing nuclear war, and prohibiting all nuclear tests.

The Venezuelan foreign minister also spoke of the unproductive nature of the multilateral talks on disarmament. He reminded delegates that it had been 10 years since the end of the First Special UN Session on Disarmament and that mankind had still not achieved any concrete results in the international talks on this matter.

An analysis of bilateral and multilateral activities in the sphere of disarmament in the last 5 years (since the formation of the "Delhi Six") suggests that one form of activity cannot be substituted for the other. On the contrary, one must supplement the other. The bilateral talks between the great powers on nuclear disarmament are the necessary initial phase of the disarmament process, but this does not exclude the possibility of multilateral talks on nuclear and chemical weapons and on conventional arms.

Footnotes

1. UN Doc: A/S-15/PV.10, 20 June 1988, p 8.

2. H. Palma, "America Latina: Limitacion de armamentos y desarme en la region," Lima, 1986, p 29.

3. UN Doc: A/42/PV.5, 23 November 1987, p 51.

4. UN Doc: A/S-15/PV.5, 10 June 1988, p 41.

5. UN Doc: A/CONF/130/PC/INF/8, 28 February 1986, p 6.

6. "Disarmament. Periodical Review by United Nations," New York, 1986, vol IX, No 2, p 270.

7. UN Doc: A/36/PV.6, September 1981, p 51.

8. UN Doc: A/S-15/PV.5, 10 June 1988, p 41.

9. UN Doc: A/41/PV.25, 9 September 1986, pp 18-20.

10. UN Doc: A/41/PV.14, 1 October 1986, p 47.

11. UN Doc: A/C.1/42/PV.10, 22 October 1987, p 7.

12. UN Doc: A/42/PV.13, 29 September 1987, p 51.

13. Antigua and Barbuda, Honduras, Grenada, the Dominican Republic, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, St. Christopher and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, and Jamaica.

14. UN Doc: A/C.1/42/PV.7, 20 October 1986, pp 18-20.

15. UN Doc: A/S-15/PV.10, 20 June 1988, p 6.

16. Ibid., p 7.

17. UN Doc: A/S-15/PV.12, 22 June 1988, p 38.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

EC Assesses Production of Suspected CW Agent

AN8900000278 Luxembourg OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES in English No C202, 7 Aug 89 pp 1-2

[EC document: Written questions by EC Member of Parliament Willy Kuijpers to the Commission of the European Communities concerning checks on the production of thiodiglycol, and the Commission's reply]

[Text] Thiodiglycol was used in the Gulf War between Iran and Iraq for the manufacture of chemical weapons. In Belgium the export of thiodiglycol is subject to licence. Thiodiglycol, however, is a waste product in the production of mercaptans, and so is produced automatically every time mercaptans are manufactured.

The use of chemical weapons is banned under the Geneva Protocol, so the export of constituent products to high-risk areas that may endanger European security, such as the Gulf states, should also be banned.

Will the Commission answer the following questions with regard to the production of thiodiglycol as a waste product in the manufacture of mercaptans?

1. Which firms in the Community produce mercaptans (and thus thiodiglycol)?

2. Who in the individual Member States monitors what happens to the thiodiglycol?

3. Do the individual Member States have any legislation on the use and export of thiodiglycol and, if so, what are its provisions?

4. What quantities of thiodiglycol are produced in the Community by country?

5. What happens to the thiodiglycol produced in the various Member States?

6. To which countries have Community Member States exported thiodiglycol for each year since 1984, and what are the quantities involved?

Answers Given by Mr Narjes [Vice President of the EC Commission] on Behalf of the Commission

According to the specialist literature, the production of thiodiglycol (TDG) as a waste product in the manufacture of thiols (mercaptans) is not the process used for the manufacture of thiodiglycol in significant quantities.

1. The Commission does not dispose of the necessary information to enable it to provide a list of Community firms producing mercaptans.

2. Thiodiglycol was added to the list of dangerous substances and classified as an irritant in the Directive of the Commission 83/431/EEC. The competent authorities in each Member State are responsible for monitoring that this labelling is implemented.

3. The Commission is aware that in all Member States export for thiodiglycol is subject to licence for each consignment exported, but is not aware of the exact provisions of such legislation.

4. Thiodiglycol production figures, either at the Community level or at individual Member State level, are not available to the Commission.

5. The major chemical uses of thiodiglycol appear to be make derivatives that are used either as solvent for dyestuffs, as lubricants, or as cross-linking agents for textile finishing.

6. In the Community's nomenclature for trade statistics, thiodiglycol does not have a separate position but is classed with a range of orango-sulphur compounds, so it is not possible to provide export statistics for it separately. The statistics show that there were no exports recorded under the NIMEXE position referring to organo-sulphur compounds, which include thiodiglycol, to the countries mentioned in the Honourable Member's question between 1984-1986. The full statistics for 1987 are not yet available.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Altenburg on Post-CFE NATO Nuclear Doctrine

36200200z Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 24 Jul 89 pp 20-23

[Interview with Lt Gen Wolfgang Altenburg, conducted by SPIEGEL staffers Alexander Szandar and Diethelm Schroeder at Brussels, date not given: "A Fraction of Our Nuclear Weapons Is All We Need"; first paragraph is DER SPIEGEL introduction]

[Text] Wolfgang Altenburg, a four-star general, has held the post of chairman of the NATO military committee since 1986 and thus is the highest-ranking military man in the Western Alliance. On 30 September, 61-year-old Altenburg will retire from active service. Altenburg, an expert in nuclear weapons and strategy, joined the Bundeswehr as a private in 1956 and has experienced a meteoric rise through the ranks. Prior to his NATO assignment he served as chief of staff of the Bundeswehr from 1983 to 1986—the first officer to hold that post who did not serve in Hitler's Wehrmacht.

[DER SPIEGEL] Following the NATO exercise "Wintex-Cimex," general, you were quite upset—not about the nuclear war scenarios that were played out in those maneuvers, but about the fact that some of the details were published in DER SPIEGEL. Can you tell us why?

[Altenburg] Because Wintex is being used to make unsound arguments. Wintex is a procedural exercise. If it were a depiction of real situations, it would definitely be unacceptable.

[DER SPIEGEL] The military conducts maneuvers during peacetime to practice actions to be taken in case of crisis and war.

[Altenburg] Wintex was used to practice procedures rather than military or political decisions. The purpose of this exercise is not to teach analytical thinking and real decisionmaking.

[DER SPIEGEL] If that is true, what about the war game aspect of the exercise?

[Altenburg] Wintex starts with the assumption that one does not know whether these events will really come to pass. Some areas, e.g. the Atlantic, and some countries are not included, and the whole thing is compressed into the space of just a few days so that there is no way to conduct a genuine analysis.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you really need such a tremendous apparatus to play out such an unrealistic game? Do you really need 100 officers and officials sitting in bunkers deep underground to see whether the telephones work and who has to communicate with whom at what time?

[Altenburg] This is an exercise to see that things work from the top of the governments of 16 sovereign nations down to the communal authorities. That requires a huge effort. In the final analysis the idea is to make sure that the consultation mechanisms really do work. That is an extremely important objective which we Germans should be particularly interested in achieving.

[DER SPIEGEL] NATO bases such exercises on scenarios which Chancellor Kohl has called unacceptable from the German point of view.

[Altenburg] I can see why the Chancellor would say that, if Wintex were designed the way it is for a national emergency. But that is not the case. I do admit that we could do better in selecting our scenarios. I am not inclined to view the whole business as a real situation.

[DER SPIEGEL] You are one of the few West German military men who are genuinely familiar with nuclear weapons and their effects. In the early sixties, you commanded an "Honest John" missile battery, and in the early seventies you were deputy chief of the nuclear issues department at NATO headquarters. Looking at Wintex 89, one comes to the conclusion that virtually nothing has changed in the past 30 years.

[Altenburg] I do not agree with that assessment. When I compare the Wintex scenarios of the seventies with those of today, then I hope that the present trend will continue, i.e. the steady reduction in the use of nuclear weapons. It has taken on a different dimension. I have the documentary evidence to prove it.

[DER SPIEGEL] Please do.

[Altenburg] I am not permitted to do so; but there are reliable witnesses who can.

[DER SPIEGEL] Judging by the data prepared by the Bundeswehr operations staff, Wintex 91, the next such exercise, will be exactly the same as Wintex 89.

[Altenburg] That is what you say. What is more, the decision has not yet been made. I have not seen the new scenario yet.

[DER SPIEGEL] We could show it to you.

[Altenburg] Believe me: In the sixties, Wintex called for a far greater use of nuclear weapons than this year's Wintex exercise. And this trend will continue with Wintex 91.

[DER SPIEGEL] You have always maintained that you view nuclear weapons as political weapons which serve solely as deterrents. Wintex 89 not only called for the first use of nuclear weapons but also, for the first time, for the follow-on use of dozens of nuclear weapons in Europe. The two statements don't add up, do they?

[Altenburg] They do. They are part of the philosophy; of the theory of deterrence. First use is designed to restore deterrence, i.e. the status quo ante, in the aftermath of an aggression. Since we are not willing to fight a conventional war on our soil, we plan a first use which does not hit the territory of the FRG. But since we cannot rule out in theory that the adversary's troops will penetrate our territory, the Alliance also takes a second strike into consideration. But that is a theory which I believe will probably never have to be put into action. No, I am even sure of it.

[DER SPIEGEL] If deterrence were to fail; if the Soviet Union were to start a war, one would have to assume that Moscow was acting quite irrationally. The first use of nuclear weapons would then suddenly bring the very people in the Kremlin, who have just ordered an attack contrary to all reason, back to their senses? Is that supposed to be realistic and credible?

[Altenburg] If an aggression took place, it would occur on the basis of a nmiscalculation of the intentions and capabilities of the Alliance. This miscalculation, however, must and should be corrected, for example, by sending a signal through the use of a nuclear weapon outside our own territory.

[DER SPIEGEL] Just recently you argued that NATO needs to have nuclear weapons as long as the East's superiority in conventional forces continues. If the Vienna talks on conventional disarmament between the Atlantic and the Urals were to succeed, that would lay the nuclear weapons issue to rest—or would it?

[Altenburg] Nuclear weapons serve a dual purpose. First, they are a political means of preventing war and secondly, as I pointed out, they are a military-political

means of ending a war and restoring deterrence. This strategy was based on a political decision. The type and number of nuclear weapons necessary under such a strategy depend upon the conventional balance of forces. Once the Vienna talks succeed in reaching the balance of forces desired by both sides, we will be faced with an entirely new situation regarding the nuclear element of NATO strategy.

[DER SPIEGEL] Then there would no longer be a need for nuclear artillery because....

[Altenburg] That certainly does apply to the artillery....

[DER SPIEGEL] Even conservative German politicians are saying the shorter the range the deader the Germans.

[Altenburg] In my view that is a misleading statement. As part of nuclear strategy all members of the Alliance are at risk. There is no answer to the question of who is exposed to greater danger and who is not. If we want to prevent war, we have to think accordingly.

[DER SPIEGEL] McGeorge Bundy, security adviser to the U.S. President in the sixties, writes in his most recent book that it is not the number of nuclear weapons that is decisive for deterrence but the understanding by the other side that it will face a counterstrike if it launches a nuclear attack. Do you agree with that?

[Altenburg] I agree with the basic argument. I believe that the political function of nuclear weapons can be fulfilled with a fraction of the existing arsenal if we have achieved an equitable balance of conventional forces.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does that mean a return to the doctrine of massive retaliation? In Europe, nuclear weapons have been reduced; but the two superpowers which hold the power of life and death over the world retain a certain number of intercontinental missiles—[let us say 50 percent of their present potential?

[Altenburg] In the final analysis, a fraction of 50 percent might even be sufficient to fulfill the deterrent function. But it does raise the question of credibility. Maxwell Taylor already did so in the early sixties in his book, "The Uncertain Trumpet." Is it credible that the jump in escalation will immediately go to the largest and most dangerous weapons? Or is it more credible if there are intermediate levels—albeit a very few—to provide a convincing picture of the deterrent function of nuclear weapons?

[DER SPIEGEL] You said recently that Soviet military thought is different from what it was just a few years ago. What has changed as a result of glasnost?

[Altenburg] Soviet thinking began to change under Andropov but not under Brezhnev. Under Brezhnev, we experienced one of the most formidable military arms buildups the Soviet Union ever undertook—a situation that seems to have come to an end today. Soviet nuclear strategy also underwent a distinct change. Marshal Sokolovskiy still went on the assumption that nuclear war was unavoidable; but Marshal Ogarkov believed in the likelihood of limited conventional war. But that points up the problem we have. Limited conventional war spells disaster for Central Europe. It must be avoided.

[DER SPIEGEL] Isn't the Ogarkov approach passe, too? The Soviet Union appears willing to make concessions at the conventional disarmament talks which would have been considered unthinkable 3 or 4 years ago.

[Altenburg] Only the end of the Vienna negotiations will tell.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you believe that the U.S. President's wish for results in Vienna within 6 to 12 months will be fulfilled?

[Altenburg] In response to a question following the NATO summit, Secretary of State Baker said he thought this was optimistic but not unrealistic.

[DER SPIEGEL] For decades, military men and diplomats were unable to bring their preparations for such negotiations to a close and to define what a tank or an attack helicopter is. How much pressure has to be brought to bear on diplomats and military men in order to make them work faster?

[Altenburg] I agree with you. In order to get agreement on definitions, it simply takes political pressure—on both sides.

[DER SPIEGEL] It is not only the East that has problems with the data; NATO does, too.

[Altenburg] That may well be. At the moment, we are in the definition phase. That will take time; but there is nothing to be done about that. I am quite optimistic. As of now, very distinct possibilities for a compromise, for an agreement, are beginning to appear. You may now ask me why I am so optimistic about the Vienna negotiations.

[DER SPIEGEL] Consider the question asked.

[Altenburg] The reason why I am so optimistic is that the interest of both sides in disarmament is so great that the path already taken can no longer be abandoned. It is plain to see that Gorbachev is faced with economic problems. The Soviet Union and the nations of the Warsaw Pact can no longer afford the high cost of armaments. On our side, too, we can see a distinct reduction in arms budgets—plainly for economic reasons. Ecological and economic spending over the next few years will rise to such an extent that military spending at current levels will no longer be possible. There is one more point I consider extremely important: Gorbachev needs a different kind of East-West relationship in order to achieve economic cooperation with the West and thereby better conditions in his own country. He cannot solve his problems simply by cutting the arms budget.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Soviets have already announced that they will make drastic cuts in arms spending. The NATO defense ministers have reiterated that they will increase their arms budgets by 3 percent every year. How is the man in the street supposed to make sense of that?

[Altenburg] That 3 percent increase should be taken as a kind of declaration of intent. I can see what is actually being put on the table and I really ask myself what the point of that statement was.

[DER SPIEGEL] Despite the hopeful signs coming from the disarmament talks political leaders and military men keep saying that there is no alternative to NATO's flexible response strategy which calls for first use of nuclear weapons. Is Helmut Schmidt, the former chancellor and defense minister, right in maintaining that the old NATO strategy lacks credibility and that the Western Alliance is in need of a new one?

[Altenburg] Let me say first of all that the flexible response strategy has changed to such an extent over the years that its present implementation has all the earmarks of a new strategy. Secondly, if parity in the balance of forces between East and West is achieved, we will probably have to come up with some new ideas.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are there people inside NATO whose job it is to come up with unconventional ideas and heretical views?

[Altenburg] NATO is the nations that make up the Alliance. Ours is just a small staff. Broadly speaking, the military council in Brussels serves as a forum for the will of the member nations and not really as a think tank that comes up with new ideas. But we do just that nevertheless. When we went to Vienna on 8 December 1988 with an arms control proposal following Gorbachev's New York speech, we were thinking in terms of cutting down to 90 percent of present NATO strength. Following President Bush's proposals in Brussels, we have already come down to 85 percent of present NATO strength. And today we are thinking about what would happen if we made even deeper cuts. In simple terms, that raises a lot of questions with respect to time, space, and forces.

[DER SPIEGEL] Those are questions to be addressed by specialists. We would like to know how much longer you can live with a strategy which no longer has the support of a majority of the population, including those of draft age?

[Altenburg] I agree with you. We have a great deal of trouble gaining acceptance. In part, this is due to the fact that the elements of the strategy, as is often the case, have not been correctly explained to the public. For another thing, we have not yet found a way of clarifying the changes in strategy on the basis of the incipient changes in East-West relations.

[DER SPIEGEL] Could you imagine an East-West conference at which the military leaders of both sides sit down to discuss the fundamentals of their two strategies and come up with ideas about what could be done to appear less warlike and aggressive?

[Altenburg] I can, in principle. I have already had a television debate with Marshal Akhromeyev. In the course of the debate Akhromeyev asked whether we couldn't also discuss strategies and doctrines. The individual member states of the Alliance would have to reach a decision on that point. I would be for it.

[DER SPIEGEL] When you were selected for your present post, you objected to a remark made by Gerd Schmueckle, a fellow general, to the effect that the chairman of the NATO military committee is the highest-ranking breakfast director of the Alliance. At that time, you said that the job had possibilities. What did you make of it; what have you achieved

[Altenburg] Breakfast is still my favorite meal of the day.

[DER SPIEGEL] We couldn't agree more.

[Altenburg] I believe that the political and diplomatic agencies listen to what the military committee has to say. And that amounts to quite a bit. I believe that we have excellent coordination between the three NATO supreme commanders and the military committee—because the committee is made up of the chiefs of staff of the member nations. For another thing, the head of the military committee is the only military man who sits at the table of the heads of government and the foreign and defense ministers, and thus has an excellent opportunity to present the coordinated will of the chiefs of staff of the member nations to the political organs of the Alliance.

[DER SPIEGEL] That does not sound especially substantive.

[Altenburg] The military committee is a reflection of the fact that we are an alliance made up of 16 sovereign nations. I can recall certain instances when a vote taken by this military committee was at variance with the views of the supreme military commanders of the Alliance.

[DER SPIEGEL] You are referring to the fact that the supreme commanders initially rejected the zero option for medium-range nuclear missiles.

[Altenburg] Yes.

[DER SPIEGEL] You are a German general; the citizen of a country situated on the border between East and West which would be in great danger in case of war. While serving on the NATO military committee, were you ever faced with a serious conflict?

[Altenburg] No one can deny that the fate of his own nation concerns him deeply. But I believe that the world has grown a little too small for people to focus on their particular interests exclusively. Of course it hurts when one must sometimes subordinate specific interests of one's own country to those of the Alliance as a whole.

[DER SPIEGEL] Could you give us an example?

[Altenburg] We started out by talking about the Wintex exercise.

[DER SPIEGEL] General, we thank you for this interview.

FINLAND

Paper Views Neutrals' Role in Vienna Talks

52002433 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 15 Jul 89 p 2

[Editorial: "Neutrals' Turn in CSCE"]

[Text] The neutral countries raised their profile in Vienna this week just before the vacation break for the security and arms talks that are part of the European security and cooperation process. The NN [neutral nations] group presented its proposal with regard to their own common military affairs and security to the members of the military alliances, a proposal that for the first time in a long time clearly shows the differences between the neutral and independent members as compared with the alliance members.

The NN group's proposal also reminded them that the neutral countries have just as established and clearly defined national interests to be safeguarded as do the military alliance members. The reminder is in order in the Europe of today, where the military alliances' concern for their security is often more readily understood than is the independent, neutral countries' concern for their inviolability.

The proposal reminded them that the neutral countries' armed forces are defensive in nature and sharply differ in this respect from the military alliances' armed forces, which have a powerful attack capability because of their numbers alone. The military alliances' armies are standing armies, whereas the neutrals' forces are essentially reserves in nature. In general, there are plenty of differences, and the NN group's proposal lists all of them, such as, for example, nuclear weapons, which only the military alliances have. The proposal encourages broader discussion of security policy in directing attention to the differences between the defense establishments of the different groups of countries.

The proposal of the neutral countries was made at a "meeting of the 35 [the CSCE signatories]," where confidence-building measures were discussed. The "talks of the 23 [the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries]" are held in the form of their own CST [Conventional Stability Talks], which deal with disarmament and in which members of the NN group do not participate. The proposal suggests the possibility of combining concurrent talks, maintaining that the matter could be discussed at the CSCE follow-up conference in Helsinki in 1992. It would initiate a new phase in Europe, and it may be realized if the pace maintained during this summer's CST is retained in the future as well.

The Warsaw Pact nations and NATO have made their own proposals at the CST to limit conventional weapons. NATO presented its proposal on Thursday of this week and indicated a strong desire to quicken the pace of the arms limitation talks. A large number of the differences that prevailed in the spring have been resolved, and the military alliances will be able to enter into detailed discussions right away in the fall. NATO has made its own concessions, clearly encouraged to do so by the Soviet Union's unilateral concessions in the winter and the spring.

The neutral countries' proposal concentrates on measures that will increase trust. The next time, they will present a proposal for an exchange of naval information. This will hit NATO hard since it has refused to bring the navies into the jurisdiction of the CSCE. The NN group is also proposing an exchange of information on the composition of peacetime ground forces right down to very far-reaching details. The object is to create a practice that requires the countries in question to turn over information to one another on arms and equipment that are offensive in nature, too, in addition to information on troops and garrisons. It is territorial conquest that is knocking on the doors of the Warsaw Pact.

The proposals involving monitoring are of the same kind, but even more detailed. If they are implemented even in part, accurate new maps and other materials will be exchanged in addition to information. The generally tolerant mood prevailing in East and West is at present also reinforcing expectations that the NN-group proposals will be accepted as a basis for negotiations for the coming winter season.

FRANCE

'Deterrence' Logic Seen Superseding NATO's

52002434 Paris LIBERATION in French 31 Aug 89 p 7

[Article by Frederic Bozo, researcher at the French Institute of International Relations: "Deterrence: Lessons From the French Model"]

[Text] The current nuclear deterrence crisis is actually two-in-one: There is a credibility crisis (can deterrence protect us?), but most of all a legitimacy crisis (is deterrence dangerous for those it must protect?). But the crisis affects unequally NATO with its strategy of graduated response and France with its independent strategy. There is a great deal to be learned from comparing the two situations.

Ever since the introduction of American nuclear weapons to Europe they have been presented as compensation for the crushing superiority of the Soviets. The flexible response adopted by NATO, without France, in 1967 led to an emphasis on their military effectiveness at

the expense of their role in averting conflict. Admittedly, the goal was to strengthen expanded deterrence by enabling the United States to stop an attack in Europe without triggering a nuclear apocalypse, the threat of which was no longer credible.

This logic, dictated by the facts at the time, and which, when all is said and done, sustained a solid posture of deterrence for over 20 years now traps leaders of the integrated military organization in a vicious circle. The more nuclear weapons are presented in terms of their employment, the less acceptable they are to public opinion. This results in whole segments of the panoply being challenged, either in favor of disarmament (Euromissiles) or unilaterally (short-range weapons). The credibility of the strategy as a whole is sapped. The less credible the strategy, the less acceptable it is since it is felt to be dangerous.

The French strategy is entirely different. Postulating that a war—whether conventional or nuclear—in Europe would be an unparalleled disaster and contesting the idea that a major conflict can be stopped by defeating the aggressor, it justifies the necessity of nuclear weapons on grounds of deterrence alone. It is a refusal, in word and deed, of any nuclear escalation. It is said that our country's immunity to antinuclear sentiment is due to the fact that France possesses and can independently trigger its nuclear force. But it is above all the specific nature of our concept of deterrence that cements the legitimacy of nuclear weapons in France. Should this concept evolve toward a "French-style flexibility", as has been suggested for the sake of European and Atlantic solidarity, it will become apparent that the "made in France" ethic of this unnatural weapons strategy will not prevent public opinion from quickly becoming alienated. Which does not mean (it is an entirely separate question) that French deterrence is fated to remain within our boundaries.

Does this striking contrast between the French scene and that of the rest of NATO give us any indications for the future? Certainly. It is now clear that the present crisis in the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence in Europe can be overcome only by radically modifying the way it is presented by our allies, starting with those who have nuclear responsibilities: the United States and Great Britain. As it happens, attentive observers of the strategic debate are noting unmistakable signs of just such a trend. Certain buzz words of NATO strategic vocabulary have recently become scarce in conversations between experts. The documents adopted at the NATO summit last May, notably the famous "total concept of disarmament and arms control", can only be interpreted as a discreet victory of French concepts in the matter: a new adjective—"substrategy"—strangely reminiscent of our "prestrategy," has cropped up to designate nuclear theater weapons.

Emphasis must switch from the justification of weapons to the political legitimacy of deterrence. Clinging to a simple discussion of means is an abdication of strategic thinking and, in the long term, a failure of deterrence. We can congratulate ourselves that French models are finally beginning to be understood by our allies. Let's hope it is the first step in a comprehensive reflection from which we have everything to gain.

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